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ABSTRACT 
 
PROBLEMS OF ONTOLOGY  
IN GILLES DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Haydar Öztürk 
M.A. in Media and Visual Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
January-2008 
 
This thesis bases on the examination of Deleuze and Guattari’s some philosophical 
concepts to argue that existence means connections and we need an ontology of 
“and” that is able to reflect this meaning. In this thesis, the relations of things are 
grasped without introducing ontological hierarchy between them and traditional 
ontological concepts are introduced in order to refer the problem of connection. In 
that respect, the concept of machine and its correspondences in their philosophy are 
read in an ontological context, and some aesthetical and political results of ontology 
of “and” are emphasized.  
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ÖZET 
 
GILLES DELEUZE’ÜN FELSEFESİNDE  
VARLIKBİLİM PROBLEMLERİ 
 
Haydar Öztürk 
Medya ve Görsel Çalışmalar Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Danışman: Yard. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Ocak,2008 
 
Bu tez Deleuze ve Guattari’nin bazı felsefi kavramlarının varoluşun ilişkisellik 
anlama geldiğini ve bu anlamı yansıtabilen “ve” varlıkbilimine olan ihtiyacı iddia 
etmek için incelenmesi üzerine kuruludur. Bu tezde şeyler arasındaki ilişkiler 
varlıkbilimsel bir hiyerarşi ortaya konmadan idrak edilmekte ve bazı geleneksel 
varlıkbilim kavramları ilişkisellik problemine atıfta bulunmak için ortaya 
konmaktadır. Bu amaçla makine kavramı ve bu kavramın onların felsefesindeki 
uzlaşımları varlıkbilimsel bağlamda okunmakta ve “ve” varlıkbiliminin bazı estetik 
ve politik sonuçları vurgulanmaktadır.  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Makine, Varlıkbilim, Fark, Köksap, “Ve”.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is on the possibility of ontology of ‘and’ that replaces ontology of ‘is’ 
with respect to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Ontology is an abstruse issue in 
their philosophy. The discussions on their philosophy of ontology begin with the 
question whether they postulate a theory of ontology or not, and this thesis argues 
that the context of ontology corresponds to the context of philosophy in their 
philosophy: “[p]hilosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else; but there is 
no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense”.1 (Ontology of essence 
corresponds to ontology of “is” and ontology of sense corresponds to ontology of 
“and”.) Then, ontology is the ground in their philosophy. However, this ground only 
operates in the sense that there is no ontology in itself.  
 
The research problem of this thesis is, in its general form, how we can postulate a 
theory of ontology that grasps the relations of things without introducing ontological 
iron between them. This means everything has relations (or connections) and these 
relations predicate ‘becoming’ and ‘flows’. In this respect, if we accept that the 
changes are inevitable and the changes of a thing depend on the connections that it 
has, then we need a theory of ontology that offers principles of connectivity and 
nullifies endings and beginnings. In other words, ontology of connections (or as we 
call ontology of “and”) needs the seeing from the middle. 
 
                                               
1
 Deleuze, Gilles. “Review of Jean Hyppolite's Logique et Existence”  
in http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze6.htm  
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Although this issue has an irrefutable place in the history of philosophy, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy has a unique place in the discussions on connection. Their 
works do not begin with first principles but grasp the philosophical questions in the 
middle’. This view overturns subject-object relations for the purpose of introducing a 
philosophy of difference and becoming that is not derived from static being; a 
philosophy of the event, not of the signifier-signified; a form of content that consists 
of a complex of forces that are not separable from their form of expression; the 
assemblage or body without organs, not the organized ego; time, intensity and 
duration instead of space; in short, a world in constant motion consisting of 
becomings and encounters.2 Because of these elements and concepts, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy is purposive for the aim of postulating a theory of ontological 
connections. In other words, in this thesis, we read some concepts of their philosophy 
as a proper ontological argument, an argument about the nature of existence to claim 
that Deleuze and Guattari narrate a new way of ontology that is ontology of “and”.  
 
In the following chapter, we will try to explain Deleuze’s conception of difference 
that offers a way to affirm the world. While doing that, we will use Deleuze’s 
reading of Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche’s philosophy with respect to the concept 
of difference. Although good sense contrasts difference and connection, they 
correspond to each other in the sense of affirming multiplicity and changes. 
Bergsonian “difference in kind”, Spnozian “immanency of difference” and 
Nietzsche’s arguments on “returning of difference” (I think and hope) will be a base 
to determine the arguments of later chapters.  
                                               
2
 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London: Routledge 
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In the third chapter, we will deal with different interpretations of Deleuze’s ontology 
with respect to the main concepts (Being, event, virtual and actual) that address 
critical issues surrounding Deleuze’s ontology. With the investigation of these 
concepts, the distinction between traditional ontology and Deleuze’s ontology 
becomes clear and they show the need for a new expression of ontology.  
 
In the fourth chapter, we will examine the possibility of ontology of “and”. Ontology 
of “and” is a map of what is going on. It is a result of postulating the concept of 
rhizome and the concept of machine as ontological maps. In this respect, the concept 
of rhizome will be introduced as the method of doing ontology of “and”. It is seeing 
and understanding from middle. It is “…and…and…and”. Then, the concept of 
machine is the name of ontological expansion of rhizome. It entails a break in our 
habitual sense of self and in our habitual responses to the world and remapping them.  
Shortly, it rejects individualism and turns everything to its relations.  
 
In the fifth chapter, we will turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s theories on aesthetics and 
politics to show that how ontology of “and” (or machine) governs their theories on 
them. In this chapter, ontology becomes an “and” for the theories of aesthetics and 
politics. Another way of saying this is that the ontology of “and” is description of 
production, but it is not necessarily the meaning of the product. The meaning of the 
product can be taken in all formations. Then, two formations are primary in relation 
to machinic ontology. They are aesthetics and politics.   
 
 4
In conclusion, we will have to face with the fact that all kinds of existence take their 
meaning with the relations or the connections that they have and it is a machinic 
circle in which everything is both product and production.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF DELEUZIAN DIFFERENCE 
 
Deleuze’s early philosophy is generally described as the philosophy of difference. 
The concept of difference has many aspects in his philosophy and most of aspects are 
derivations from other philosophers or (as Deleuze indicates) from philosophers of 
‘difference’. They are mainly Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche. Deleuze considers 
those philosophers as ‘minor’ philosophers of difference and constructs them against 
‘major’ philosophers of difference, for example Hegel. 
 
According to Deleuze, minor philosophers lay the groundwork for thinking the 
concept of difference. The general property that they share is the affirmation of 
difference, while Hegelian difference is that of negation or contradiction (for Hegel, 
a thing must be in itself the negation of something else, which is also negatively 
determined).3 The affirmation of difference occurs with different expressions in their 
philosophies. In Bergson’s philosophy, it occurs with “differences of kind” (or 
internal difference). In Spinoza’s philosophy, it occurs with “immanency of 
difference”. In Nietzsche’s philosophy, it occurs with “the return of difference”. In 
this chapter, my aim is to investigate ontology of difference with respect to Deleuze’s 
explanation of these philosophers’ theories. Then, this investigation will show us that 
the affirmation of difference is ontology of seeing the world: it is not composed of 
identities that form and reform themselves, but various differences that actualize 
themselves into specific forms of identity. It is more accurate to say that we must 
                                               
3
 All things are inherently contradictory (Hegel, 1969, 439). Hegel’s explanation says us that if either 
we say of thing that it is (what is) or we say of them that it is not (what is not), we must know it is not 
(what is not) to say it is (what is). 
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know what the aspects of difference are to say that the connection occurs between 
differences as the main subject of this thesis.  
 
2.1 Bergson’s Ontology of Internal Difference  
 
From psychology to ontology in his all writings, Bergson’s emphasis is on 
apprehending singular experience as the reality in which we live. His central claim is 
that earlier philosophers produced concepts that are large to the world ‘like baggy 
clothes’ and his aim is to create concepts that are appropriate to their subject. It is the 
concept of ‘difference’ in Bergson’s philosophy that covers Bergsonian postulation 
of the relation between concept and subject. Bergson’s philosophy is the one of the 
historical traces on Deleuze’s philosophy, especially on his theory of aesthetics and 
ontology. In this part, my aim is to present Deleuze’s reading of Bergsonian and to 
show the implications of Bergson’s affirmative ontology of difference. 
 
Bergson’s ontology is, first of all, an affirmation of the positive movement of being 
that exists for itself. He does not take ontological position of difference between 
beings and Being. Contrary to Platonic postulation of ‘Being’ that was given once 
and complete, Bergson alleges that ‘Being’ is an unfolding process. As Deleuze 
states, for Bergson, “[t]here are differences in being and yet nothing negative” (B, 
46).  This means being is difference in the sense that being is durational. “In 
Bergson… the thing differs with itself first, immediately”.4 Then, Bergson’s solution 
                                               
4
 Deleuze, G. (1956) ‘La conceptioan de la difference chez Bergson’, Les Etudes Bergsoniennes 4: 77-
112. In Michael Hardt. Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 7.  
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to “bad-infinity” is to be other with/in itself. In other words, Bergson affirms the 
infinity of limited internally. 
 
For Bergson, differentiation as the foundational movement of life can occur in two 
ways, qualitative (difference in kind) and quantitative (difference in degree). Bergson 
argues that there remains an irreducible difference between quality and quantity 
despite the relations of production between them in the sense that “[s]ometimes a 
difference in degree can be so immense that it creates a difference in nature” 
(Bergson, 1977, 10). What is it that differentiates qualitative difference from 
quantitative difference? It may well be impossible to answer or even to ask such a 
question, that is, to state what type of difference, of degree and in kind, differentiates 
the set of all differences in kind from the set of all differences of degree.  This is a 
type of Russelian paradox. To attempt an answer would be to cite a difference that 
must fall into one of the two sets rather than a third which separates them. Although 
any form of difference that exists belongs to one or the other of the two, Bergson’s 
aim is to cite that “[i]t is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of a 
quality without quantity” (Bergson, 1990, 123). That is the point that Deleuze uses 
for difference in itself in the sense that “[w]hat Bergson essentially reproaches his 
predecessors for is not having seen the real differences of nature… Where there were 
differences of nature, they only recognized differences of degree” (Hardt, 7). 5 
According to Bergson and Deleuze, where “differences of degree” or the quantitative 
                                               
5
. In that respect, Bergson’s also denies Kantian the “perception-matter” dualism. According to 
Bergson, the difference between the perception of matter and matter itself is difference in degree, not 
difference in kind.  “Between this perception of matter and matter itself there is but a difference of 
degree not of kind …the relation of the part to the whole…My consciousness of matter is no longer 
either subjective …or relative…It is not subjective for it is in things rather than in me. It is not 
relative, because the relation between “phenomenon” and the “thing” is not that of appearance to 
reality, but merely that of the part to the whole” (Bergson, 1911, 78&306).  
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difference corresponds to multiplicity that is actual, numeric and discontinuous, 
“differences of nature” or the qualitative difference corresponds to the multiplicity 
that is virtual, nonnumeric and continuous.  
It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, 
of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference in degree; it is 
a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type 
of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity 
of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of 
qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is … 
continuous multiplicity that can not be reduced to numbers (B, 38). 
 
 
How to think non-numerical multiplicity?  For Bergson, it is the condition of 
possibility of difference in itself and it corresponds to the division between duration 
and space. The difference in degree occurs in space and postulates numerical 
multiplicity, whereas the difference in kind occurs with/in duration and postulates 
non-numerical multiplicity.  
The division occurs between (1) duration, which “tends” for its part 
or bear all the differences in kind (because it is endowed with the 
power of qualitatively varying with itself) and (2) space, which 
never presents anything but differences of degree (since it is 
quantitative homogeneity… When we divide something up 
according to its natural articulations…, we have: on the one hand, 
the aspects of space, by which the thing can only ever differ in 
degree from other things and from itself (augmentation, 
diminution); and on the other hand, the aspect of duration, by 
which the thing differs in kind from all others and from itself 
(alteration) (B, 31).6 
 
 
According to Deleuze, this understanding of multiplicity allows us to think beyond 
“the dialectical unity of One and Multiple” (B, 43). Bergsonian multiplicity is not the 
opposition of One. The binary, oppositional thinking can not grasp Bergsonian 
                                               
6
 The Bergsonian division between space and duration  takes its meaning also Bergson’s divition 
between philosophy and science in the sense that according to Bergson, although scientific knowledge 
on the movement or the change is useful, it reduces movement to relational stability in space. This 
means the movement is not to be in one place then in other. It is duration and has to be understood 
within itself.  This is why Deleuze apprises duration as the method.  
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durational multiplicity. In this respect, according to Deleuze even if Hegelian 
dialectic determination introduces binary opposition with the concept of negating, 
Bergson denies to reduce difference to negation by introducing the concept of 
“internal difference”.  In other words, Bergson shows that vital difference is an 
internal difference. But, also, that internal difference can not be conceived as a 
simple determination: a determination can be accidental, at least it can only sustain 
its being through a cause, an end, or a chance, and it therefore implies a subsistent 
exteriority. It is important to remind ourselves that “[w]hen Bergson talks about 
determination, he does not invite us to abandon reason, but to arrive at the true 
reason of the thing in the process of making itself, the philosophical reason is not 
determination but difference” (B, 9).  And, “[d]ifference is not determination but, in 
its essential relationship with life, a differentiation” (B, 14). 
 
Virtuality is another notion that Deleuze takes from Bergson and it explains how 
(internal) difference occurs. In Bergson’s philosophy, difference is configured as the 
realm of affect and is an act or an organized effort from virtual to actual: “Virtuality 
exists in such a way that it is realized in dissociating itself. It is the force to dissociate 
itself in order to realize itself. Differentiation is the movement of the virtuality that is 
actualizing itself” (B, 4-5). In this respect, we must be aware that virtual is not 
possible and is not realized, although it possesses a reality in the sense that the rules 
from virtual to actual and from possible to real are different. Although the rules of 
realization include the limitation and the resemblance, the rules of actualization cover 
the difference and creation. In his words:  
 10 
What difference can be there be between the existent and the non-
existent if the non-existence is already possible, already included in 
the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept 
confers upon it as a possibility?… The possible and the virtual 
are…distinguished by the fact that one refers to the form of identity 
in the concept, whereas the other designates a pure 
multiplicity…which radically excludes the identical as a prior 
condition…To the extent that the possible open to ‘realization’ it is 
understood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to 
resemble the possible. That is why it is it is difficult to understand 
what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like 
with like…Actualization breaks with resemblance as a process no 
less than it does with identity as a principle. In this sense, 
actualization or differentiation is always a genuine creation. (DR, 
211-212) 
 
2.2 Spinoza’s Immanent Difference 
Although the major writings in philosophy evaluate Spinoza’s thought as a 
continuation of Cartesian rationalism mainly in the sense of unity and singularity of 
substance, Deleuze reads him as a part of what he calls “minor tradition” in 
philosophy. At first look, it seems that Spinoza is a philosopher of the One and 
Deleuze is a philosopher of the Multiple. However, they are actually philosophers of 
the Multiple in the One. This relationship between the One and the Multiple is also 
the core of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s postulation of substance. In this part, I 
will investigate the notion of Spinozian ontology of difference in relation to 
Spinozian substance.    
 
In Spinoza’s philosophy, ontology inheres in ethics in the sense that ethics is opposed 
to morals: “Morality is the judgement of God, the system of Judgement. But Ethics 
overthrows the system of Judgement. The opposition of values…is supplanted by the 
qualitative difference of modes of existence” (PP, 22). And, the notion of the 
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substance in “ethics” governs the qualitative difference of modes of existence. Then 
what are Spinozian substance, modes and attributes?   
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived 
through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be 
formed independently of any other conception. 
 IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as 
constituting the essence of substance.     
V. By mode, I mean the modifications ["Affectiones"] of substance, 
or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other 
than itself. (Spinoza, 1) 
 
According to Deleuze, Spinoza’s substance is not a transcendent, a priori unity that 
dictates the conditions of the world or the experience from outside. This substance, 
causa sui, is what there is, it is not a priori to existence, it is what exists – it is 
immanent. This is to see the substance from the standpoint of its existence. In 
Spinoza’s philosophy, essence and existence are not two distinct different things. In 
Spinoza’s words, “[e]xistence appertains to the nature of substance” (Spinoza, 4). 
God, which is substance and causa sui, is the whole universe and everything in it. 
Then, the singularity of substance in Spinoza is not a negation of Deleuzian 
multiplicity. Deleuze appropriates Spinoza’s singularity as difference qua difference, 
for Deleuze, Spinoza presents the singularity of substance as an extended meditation 
on the positive nature of difference and the real foundation of being”. 
Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the 
modes are dependent on substance. Substance must itself be said 
of the modes and only of the modes. Such a condition can be 
satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal 
according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that 
which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. (Dr, 40-41) 
 
 
Spinozian substance does not mean sameness. As May writes, difference corresponds 
to unity in the sense of taking difference in itself (May, 1994, 43). In this respect, we 
 12 
can argue that like Bergson, Spinoza too takes the notion of difference internally. In 
Spinoza’s philosophy, there is no looking elsewhere in order to discover or 
understand our world(s). If substance is existence, to understand this world is to 
understand the existence of substance as immanence. “The significance of Spinozism 
seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any 
subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no longer 
emanates, no longer resembles anything. And such a result can be obtained only 
within a perspective of univocity” (EX, 180).7  
 
Another aspect of substance related with the notion of difference is its non-numerical 
expression in Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza challenges the Cartesian expression of 
two substances that are body and mind. According to Spinoza, there can not be two 
substances in the sense that  
If several distinct substances are given, they must be distinguished 
one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by 
the difference of their modifications (prev. Prop.). If, then, they are 
to be distinguished by the difference of their attributes, two or more 
can not be granted having the same attribute. But if they are to be 
distinguished by the difference of their modifications, since a 
substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.), therefore 
let the modifications be laid aside, and considering substance in 
itself, that is truly (Def. 3 and Def. 6), there cannot be conceived 
one substance different from another,--that is (prev. Prop.), there 
cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. 
(Spinoza, 3-4) 
 
                                               
7
“Spinoza”, [Deleuze writes] “the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the 
“best” plane of immanance – that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the 
transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusion, bad feelings, and 
erroneous perceptions” ( WP, 60).   
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Then, Russelian paradox of distinguishing the difference in degree and in kind (as it 
appears in Bergsonian notion of difference8) is not a problem for Spinoza in the sense 
that according to Spinoza, the substance is the difference of all differences and we 
can distinguish two things with the substance as ground of them or the immanence of 
them.  
 
Although the connections between Deleuze’s and Spinoza’s philosophies are more 
than what I am concerned here, there is also a fundamental difference between the 
two that is crucial to define the scope of ontology of difference. It is Spinoza’s giving 
privilege to substance over mode. This means substance is prior to its modes or its 
attributes. In his words, “[s]ubstance is by nature prior to its modifications” (Spinoza, 
3). This priority is what Deleuze critiques in the sense that it means “substance is” 
although Spinozian substance is also critique of “is”. In other words, modes or 
attributes turns around substance. However, according Deleuze, the opposite relation 
is also true: substance turns around its modes as well as the modes turns around its 
substance: “All that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of 
pure affirmation was to make Substance turn around the modes – in other words, to 
realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return” (DR, 304). 9  That 
means “substance as “and”. In other words,  
[a]ccording to Spinoza, every existing thing has an essence, but it 
also has characteristic relations through which it enters into 
composition with other things in existence, or is decomposed in 
other things. . . [A] given body enters into composition with some 
                                               
8
 See, Bergson’s (Affirmative) Ontology of Difference.  
9
 “With Spinoza, univocal being ceases to be neutralized and becomes expressive; it becomes a truly 
expressive and affirmative proposition. Nevertheless, there still remains a difference between 
substance and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are 
dependent on substance, as though on something other than themselves” (DR, 40). 
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other body, and the composite relation or unity of composition of 
the two bodies defines a common notion that cannot be reduced 
either to the essence of the parts or the essence of the whole. (PP, 
114) 
 
 
Then, what Deleuze does is to put “the composite relation or unity of composition of 
the two bodies” or things in a new relation or unity. That is the meaning of becoming 
in Deleuze’s philosophy.   
 
2.3 Nietzsche’s Difference from the Notion of Eternal Recurrence 
With his undeniable place in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche can be seen as 
prefigure of contemporary French philosophy in the sense of his endless struggle 
with metaphysical nihilist heritage and in the way of introducing an alternative to it. 
Deleuze’s connection with Nietzsche offers both the latter’s unique of metaphysics 
and his alternative in an effective way and covers most of his philosophy. The 
question of “what difference is” takes a crucial role in this apposition. In this part, I 
will introduce Nietzsche’s notion of “eternal recurrence (or return)” and Deleuze’s 
reading of it as difference.  
 
Eternal recurrence is one of most puzzling themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy and in 
Nietzsche scholarship, as it can be taken in different directions. It is a part of 
nihilism. It is an answer to nihilism. It is rebirth of myth. It is a cosmological 
doctrine. The more general ground of these directions is the eternal recurrence of 
sameness or identity. In other words, most of Nietzsche scholars take and interpret it 
in terms of the notion of sameness. However, Deleuze presents the eternal recurrence 
in terms of difference. Deleuze’s consideration does not allow the return of identity. 
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Eternal recurrence is not as it might seem because the difference between the 
continuity of the same and the disruption of the same by the differences of which it is 
composed, makes all the difference. Deleuze puts the difference as the origin: 
The eternal return has no other sense but this: the absence of any 
assignable origin — in other words, the assignation of difference as 
the origin, which then relates different to different in order to make 
it (or them) return as such. In this sense, the eternal return is indeed 
the consequence of a difference which is originary, pure, synthetic 
and in-itself (which Nietzsche called will to power). (DR, 125) 
 
 
According to Deleuze, the eternal recurrence is exactly the being of becoming, one of 
multiplicity and compulsive of accident. By reason of the eternal return, the original 
form of Identity belongs to only multiplicity and becoming, hence what comes back 
or return is not Identity. In other words, identity or sameness does not come back, 
unless that which returns is the sameness of becoming. “Return is the being of that 
which becomes. Return is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in 
becoming” (NP, 24).10  
 
“Nietzsche’s secret” is the selectivity of eternal recurrence in two senses. The first 
one is the selectivity of thought and he offers the law for the autonomy of will: 
“whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal recurrence” 
                                               
10
 See also, DES, p. 124. Like Deleuze, Klossowski too interprets the eternal recurrence as 
“vibrations” with/in being and results in novelty”. “The Eternal Return is in a way simply the mode of 
its display: the feeling of vertigo results from the once and for all in which the subject is surprised by 
the round of innumerable times: once and for all disappears: intensity emits something like a series of 
infinite vibrations of being: and it is these vibrations which project outside itself the individual self as 
so many dissonances: all reverberate until is re-established the consonance of this same instant in 
which these dissonances are reabsorbed anew.” “In short, the Eternal Return, originally, is not a 
representation, nor a postulate proper, it is an experienced fact and as thought, a sudden thought: 
phantasy or not, the Sils-Maria experience exercises its constraints as ineluctable necessity: terror and 
mirth in turn, within this felt necessity, will underlie from this instant Nietzsche's interpretations” 
(Klossowski, 148).  
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(NP, 68).11 In that respect, everything that we will only once is eliminated by eternal 
recurrence. Everything that we will with willing its eternal recurrence will create 
difference: “willing = creating” (Ibid, 69). Such things become affirmative, effective 
force by relating itself with another, without negation. In the sense that, “[i]n 
Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a 
negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other the force which makes 
itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own 
difference and enjoys this difference” (NP, 8–9).  
 
The second one is the selectivity of Being. Only affirmation and things that are 
affirmed return. Negation and things that are negated do not return. According to 
Deleuze, the eternal recurrence is like a wheel whose motion is issued with the 
centrifugal-force. It ejects the nihilism and all forms of reaction (DES, 125)  
 
Nevertheless Deleuze is aware that Nietzsche introduces eternal recurrence in many 
texts as the return of everything, the return of identity. In that respect, Deleuze asks 
“what do these texts mean?” and he offers the following answer: 
 
Nietzsche is a thinker who “dramatizes” ideas, that is, who presents 
them as successive events, with different levels of tension. … [t]he 
Eternal return is the object of two accounts. … Of two accounts, one 
concerns a sick Zarathustra, the other a Zarathustra who is 
convalescent and nearly cured. What makes Zarathustra sick is 
precisely the idea of the cycle: the idea that everything comes back, 
that the same returns, that everything comes back to the same. … 
What happened when Zarathustra was convalescent? … He accepts 
the eternal return; he grasps its joy…It is a change in the 
understanding and meaning of the eternal return itself…[that] [t]he 
eternal return is repetition; but it is repetition that selects, the 
                                               
11
 See also, DES, 124-125 and PI 87-89.  
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repetition that saves. The prodigious secret of a repetition that is 
liberating and selecting. (PI, 90-91)12  
 
 
Deleuze argues that Zarathustra’s sickness as a part of “different levels of tension” 
does not offer the eternal return of sameness or of identity, but it indicates how the 
resistance of the identity works and Zarathustra’s convalescence shows how 
difference occurs. In many usages of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche also makes us 
challenge the notion of the sameness. In other words, what Nietzsche makes is the 
interrogation of life to make allowance for the change. That is the famous passage in 
Gay Science, in which he makes this with the demon who says no change.  
The greatest weight. -- What, if some day or night a demon were to 
steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This 
life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in 
it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return 
to you, all in the same succession and sequence--even this spider 
and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I 
myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down 
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' Would you not 
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment 
when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and never have 
I heard anything more divine.' If this thought gained possession of 
you, it would change, you as you are or perhaps crush you. 
(Nietzsche, 1974, Section 341)13 
  
                                               
12This Deleuzian correspondence between Nietzsche and Zarathustra is not an utopian salvation for 
the difference of the eternal recurrence. It is in many cases what Nietzsche contributes to philosophy 
as the no-separation of philosophy and the philosopher. Of course, we can see this contribution before 
Nietzsche, such as Boetius’ talks with Lady Philosophy, Descartes’ Meditations and Plato’s 
Dialogues. However, what makes Nietzsche unique is the sickness of the philosopher. Although that 
has been taken as nihilism of Nietzsche by many commentators, Deleuze takes it as a part of 
introducing “two forms of expression into philosophy: aphorism and poetry” (PI, 65).  
13Also, in Will-to-Power, Nietzsche introduces the understanding of the eternal recurrence as the 
sameness as “the most extreme form of the nihilism”. “Let us think this thought in its most terrible 
form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of 
nothingness: the eternal. This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the meaningless), 
eternally!” (Nietzsche, 1968, Section 55).  
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The last point on eternal recurrence is its last difference. That is Superman. 
Superman is also the result of eternal recurrence. “What the eternal return produces, 
and causes to come back in correspondence with the will to power, is the Superman, 
defined as “the superior from everything that is” (DES, 125). “The eternal return 
repels and expels him [Superman]” (PI, 91). This “radical conversion” from man to 
Superman is the result of the selectivity of the eternal recurrence. In its contiguity, it 
leaves all the forms of nihilism behind Superman.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter points a way of seeing the world:  the world of identities and the world 
of differences are not two distinct worlds in the sense that identities are formed by 
relationships among differences, which continue to exist even within the identities 
they form. In that respect, I introduced different aspects that belong to the concept of 
difference with respect to Bergson’s, Spinoza’s, Nietzsche’s theories and Deleuze’s 
interpretation of them. These aspects are mainly to be internal, to be immanent and to 
return. To be internal is to distinct quantities and qualities and to say that there are 
natural differences that can not be explained by counting. To be immanent grants 
differences and their causes belongs to the world in which we live. In other words, 
there is no a second world that explains or includes differences. To return is the 
assurance of novelty and says that differences always come back. Each of these 
aspects affirms differences and does not contradict others. However, to take account 
of the differences with which we and the world are embodied requires a total 
ontology. The concept of difference must take a place in a total ontology that 
endorses and broadens the aspects of difference. Also, it is necessary to examine the 
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general concepts of Deleuze’s ontology to say that in their philosophies of ontology, 
there is a new way of ontology that denies the independent explanation of ontological 
entities and replace it with the connection of ontological entities. In that respect, in 
the next chapter, I will examine the ontology of Deleuze. It introduce what Deleuze 
means with ontology and explains the concepts that I used here for the explanation of 
the concept of difference, such as Being, virtuality, actuality, etc.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DELEUZIAN ONTOLOGY IN  
‘GENERAL’ ONTOLOGICAL TERMS 
 
 
In the history of philosophy, ontology refers to philosophical investigation of 
“existence” and “being”. Moreover, ontology is also the investigation of 
investigation in the sense that in the history of philosophy, there is no such unique 
answer to “What is existence?” or to “What is being?” Then, ontology is ontological 
questions and the answers or discussions that belong to such questions. In this 
respect, the question, “What exists?” (even though Deleuze does not ask such a 
question) has a significant introductory role in ontological discussions.14  Then, in 
this chapter my aim is, firstly, to evaluate Deleuze’s philosophy of ontology with 
comparing it with traditional ontology and, secondly, to introduce Deleuze’s 
ontological concepts that will be useful for later discussions on Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s ontologies.  
 
3.1 Entrance to Deleuze’s General Ontology  
If the question is ‘What is there?’, ‘What kinds of things ultimately exist?’ or ‘… 
really exist?’ or ‘… exist in themselves?’ then the answer is, in general, given within 
correspondence with being as the representation of the world in the sense that it relies 
on the opposition of the existence and non-existence. Such questions introduce 
ontology as the answer to what there is. The arguments for the existence / 
                                               
14
 “When I ask what is this?”, Deleuze writes, “I assume there is an essence behind appearances, or at 
least something ultimate behind the masks. The other kind of question, [such as how question], 
however, always discovers other masks behind the mask, displacements behind every place, other 
“cases” stacked up in a case” (DES, 114). In that respect, he claims that philosophy is the theory of 
what we do, not what we are (ES, 133).  
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nonexistence of God, universals, sets etc. belong to this type of ontology and they 
justify Heideggerian dispute on the ignorance of ontology in the sense that these 
types of arguments are on the side of epistemic commitment to ontological question. 
This means that their propulsion is based on the presupposition that if we know 
something, then there must be an entity that belongs to knowledge. This is the way, 
from Parmenides to Quine, many philosophers have raised ontological questions. In 
this description of ontology as the base of its questions, there are various 
philosophical traditions. Idealism takes the same questions and commonly argues 
that there is no existence independent from the human mind that perceives it. Then, 
the ontology of idealist philosophers consists mainly of mental entities, whether 
those are transcendent objects or, on the contrary, linguistic representations or social 
conventions. Also, pragmatism and positivism can be taken into this general question 
based on ontological classification although they display a radical challenge against 
idealism. Many pragmatist and positivist philosophers reject, at least doubt, the 
existence of theoretical terms and transcendent entities while they see the objects of 
everyday experience as unimpeachable.  
 
The entrance to Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology from this perspective of questions 
seems catchy for some of their commentators, for example Manuel DeLanda. 
According to him, “Deleuze is…a realist philosopher’ and his ontology ‘grants 
reality fully autonomous from the human mind, disregarding the difference between 
the observable and unobservable as betraying a deep anthropocentrism” (DeLanda, 
Deleuzian Ontology). Moreover, in reference to Deleuze’s postulation of difference 
as nuomenon rather than phenomenon (DR, 222 ), DeLanda states that “Deleuze’s 
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ontology reaches out to the mind-independent processes (noumena) which gives rise 
to …appearances in the first place” (Ibid). However, I think what DeLanda postulates 
as ‘Deleuzian Ontology’ is what Deleuze tries to escape in the sense of classic 
ontology. In the first place, the expression that is ‘reality as full autonomy from the 
human mind’ is an anthropocentrism in itself. The expression works by supposing 
outer world as different from the representation of it by human mind. In Deleuze’s 
(and Guattari’s) philosophy, there is autonomous work of creating concepts, which is 
also the description of philosophy, but that is not the autonomy of human mind, 
which corresponds to reality. The distinction between human mind and outer world 
does not take place in Deleuze’s philosophy because he does not ask whether human 
mind is more real than outer world or not. In other words, the case taken by DeLanda 
means that philosophical concepts produced by human mind is independent from 
experience, but Deleuze’s philosophy is on the side of experimental concepts. Also, 
DeLanda postulates the nuomenon as the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that in 
Deleuze’s philosophy, there is a space that is different from the world of 
appearances. However, although what Deleuze calls as the nuomenon (i.e. 
difference) seems to be the cause of appearances as DeLanda argues, the important 
point on this postulation is, in a word, ‘inexactitude’ or ‘inequality’. If we explain 
with Deleuze’s example (that is the continuing part of DeLanda’s quotation from 
DR, 222), it is not the case whether God creates and ‘calculates’ the world or not, for 
there is always an ‘inexactitude’ or ‘inequality’ in the world that can not be referred 
to God’s calculation. This means that we can suppose that there is being or 
philosophical expression that is not a part of material or experienced world, but this 
supposition can not be an explanation of ‘inequality’ in the world. Then, in Deleuze’s 
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philosophy, the relation between nuomenon and phenomenon is not the relation 
between antecedent and subsequent. Deleuze talks about the inextricable relation 
between phenomenon and nuomenon. Although DeLanda understands that Deleuze 
tries to escape from the meaning of appearances as reality, DeLanda does not 
apprehend that Deleuze does not introduce primary causes to appearances. This is the 
meaning of his phrase “nuomenon is [that is] closest to phenomenon”. To be closest 
or far away, but there is always the relation from the perspective of which Deleuze 
postulates that “[e]very phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is 
conditioned” (DR, 222).  In other words, ‘to be conditioned’ does not mean ‘to be 
caused’. And the ‘inequality’ does not belong to phenomenon, but it can not be 
postulated without phenomenon.  
 
Robert Piercey’s investigation on Deleuze’s ontology can be read as a different 
entrance although he answers the same questions as DeLanda. Piercey argues that we 
can not postulate Deleuze’s ontology in a single structure, and Piercey offers triad 
ontology with different names in The Logic of Sense (LS) and Difference and 
Repetition (DR). He distinguishes three different fields in Deleuze’s ontology. 
According to him, “claims referring to one field have a different status than those 
referring to another”, although they are not three different worlds (Piercey, 270). 
They are immanent to the world, they are different ways of describing the same 
world The tripartite scheme of DR consists of ‘good or secret repetition’, ‘bad 
repetition’ and difference. In LS, they are Event, the material world and events. In 
general, these two postulation are based on the ontological distinction between 
Being, virtual and actual.  Then, the schema is as follows: 
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          DR                                                          LS                        
         good or secret repetition………………Event …………………………Being 
         bad repetition………………………….the material world…………….actual 
        difference……………………………...events…………………………virtual 
 
 
Piercey’s schema is useful not only for understanding Deleuze’s ontological 
concepts, but also for understanding the relation between LS and DR in the sense that 
the same world is explained with different concepts in them. In other words, it is not 
the case that Deleuze designates a second world as a solution of ontological 
problems, but rather he terms the world with different statuses or gives different 
names to ontological problems. Then, if we turn to our point, the account of what 
there is, Deleuze’s answer is that it is all there. However, this does not mean that 
Deleuze says “yes” to all answers of “what there is”. He takes a different perspective. 
In other words, his ontology does not postulate a concrete answer to it in the sense 
that Deleuze’s concern is to find out what happens when these units or motifs of 
schema are effectively postulated into the same world. He puts “and” between 
different ontological fields within the same world. From the standpoint of Piercey’s 
schema, the relation between units occurs in respect of ‘transcendental analysis’: 
“Deleuze’s ontology is a kind of transcendental philosophy. His ontological claims 
emerge from something like transcendental analysis, in which they describe ‘not the 
sensible, but the being of the sensible” (Ibid). This is also the point that introduces 
the notion of being in Deleuze’s philosophy. 
 
3.1.1 Being  
It can be quite easily anticipated that Deleuze replaces being with becoming. In his 
philosophy, as I will introduce afterward, this is operative in many parts, but being 
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also takes meaning in the pronominal sense. According to Deleuze, it ‘is’ present in 
all entities and that is the point that Deleuze calls ‘the univocity of being.’ If Being 
‘is’ equally present in all entities, then it ‘is’ truly univocal. “There has only ever 
been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. There was never but one 
ontology that of Duns Scotus, who gave being one single voice. We say Duns Scotus 
because he knew how to rise univocal being to the highest point of subtlety, without 
giving in to abstraction.” (DR, 35).  
 
Then, what does the univocity of being mean? 
The univocity of Being does not mean that there is one and the 
same Being, on the contrary; beings are multiple and different [...]. 
The univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, 
and that it is said in one and the same ‘sense’ of everything about 
which it is said. That of which it is said is not at all the same, but 
Being is the same for everything about which it is said. (LS, 179) 15 
 
According to Williams, the principle of univocity and Being “displaces his 
[Deleuze’s] principle of connection in favour of a principle of determination of 
identity- it’s what you are, not what you are connected to” (Williams, 63).  However, 
I think this displacement is still the result of the traditional reading of being and there 
is no being in its traditional sense. Traditional philosophy argues that being is 
contrasted with becoming as identity versus change. This is the contradiction of one 
and many. It is the same context that Badiou, also, criticises Deleuze. In The Clamor 
of Bei, Badiou makes the investigation of Deleuze’s philosophy and his central 
criticisms are based on Deleuze’s monism: “Deleuze's fundamental problem is most 
certainly not to liberate the multiple, but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of 
                                               
15
 Also, in DR, Deleuze writes that “we must add that being, this common designated, insofar as it 
expresses itself, is said in turn in a single and same sense of all the numerically distinct designators 
and expresors.” (DR, 53) and “[a] single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a 
single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings" (DR, 389).  
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the One” (Badiou, 11). Further, for Badiou, “[t]he price one must pay for inflexibly 
maintaining the thesis of univocity is clear...ultimately, this multiple can only be that 
of the order of simulacra” (Ibid, 26). As May says, “[i]n Badiou's view, Deleuze's 
strategy is to be held that Being is to be conceptually approached from two different 
angles, one from the side of univocity and the other from the side of multiplicity. It is 
the first side that Deleuze privileges.”16 This means Badiou takes only one side of 
Deleuze’s postulation of Being. He also ignores the characteristics of Deleuzian 
Being in the sense that, with Being, Deleuze “limits us to a strictly immanent and 
materialist ontological discourse that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being. 
There is nothing veiled or negative about Deleuze’s being; it is fully expressed in the 
world. Being, in this sense, is superficial, positive and full” (Hardt, xiii). 
 
Then, if we turn to Williams’ critique, although in Deleuze’s postulation of being, 
there is the displacement of being, this is not the displacement of connection (or 
many) with identity (or One), but rather the displacement of appellation with 
pronoun. Being in its pronominal sense is not many nor the one. It is sameness, but 
not identity. The identity belongs to the thing, but the sameness belongs to sense of 
voice. However, we must be aware that this is not a contradiction between language 
and outer world in the sense that the voice is not language. Being is the paradox of 
the voice in the sense that “[the voice] has the dimensions of a language without 
having its conditions; it awaits the event that will make it a language.  It is no longer 
noise but not yet language” (LS, 194). Then, if we take Being independently from 
event, then idealism appears. However, within Deleuzian meaning, Being is the 
                                               
16
 May, Todd. “The Ontology and Politics of Gilles Deleuze” in 
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/theory_&_event/v005/5.3may.html 
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paradox of border that is between language and the world of events. Being is 
inevitable paradox and Deleuze wants to show this inevitability. Being means ground 
although there is no ground. As Beckett says, “Say ground. No ground but say 
ground.”  
 
3.1.2 Event and events  
Deleuze takes the concept of event from Stoic philosophy and introduces Stoic 
ontology as an alternative way to Platonic ontology in the sense that while Platonic 
ontology had the concept of change completely held in the surface / material world, 
and the real world of being hung out behind it as Ideas (Perfect Forms), The Stoic 
ontology moves change back into the real world behind everyday things. Things, as 
we perceive them, are on the surface. The real thing is behind the scenes, but not like 
changeless eternal Platonic Ideas. It is a thing and all its changes (transformations). 
For The Stoic, behind the scenes, an entity includes all its possibilities. The world we 
experience is a real non-determinate thing which becomes part of this surface world, 
we deal with it day in and day out. The result of the Stoic notion is that the real thing, 
the thing we are talking about, does not change properties every time as we see it 
changes in the world. Then, as an example of event, I pick up a knife and I slice an 
apple, slicing it in two but placing both halves back together. 
 
Moreover, while Platonic (and Aristotelian) ontology has to create classifications of 
essential and accidental properties to talk about the identity of this apple as the same 
before and after the slicing, Stoic ontology needs no such thing in the sense that the 
field of “the slicing” is the event and the identity of the apple is in that backworld 
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and includes the possibility that it may be split. The identity "subsists" behind the 
world in which we live and only comes into existence when it becomes manifest in 
this world, that is, when we slice the apple. 
 
Then, events are incorporeal as a result of corporeal or state of affairs. This means 
they are a kind of crystallization of the material of reality. Events 
are not bodies but, properly speaking, “incorporeal” entities. 
They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather logical 
or dialectical attributes... We cannot say that they exist, but 
rather that they subsist or inhere (having this minimum of being 
which is appropriate to that which is a thing, a nonexisting 
entity). (LS, 4–5) 
 
Events belong to the virtual field since they are “ideal by nature” (LS, 53) and are not 
to be confused with their spatio-temporal realizations in the states of affairs. 
Statements about events are fundamentally different from statements about “physical 
qualities and properties” (LS, 4). In that respect, it is really important to remind that 
what Deleuze calls as events covers nearly all results of state of affairs.  
 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze introduces three main correspondences to event that 
are as follows: “event is becoming, event is surface, and event is sense”. In other 
words, Deleuze uses corkscrew relations for event and to take a single explanation 
can be really hard and problematic. However, although these are different aspects of 
the “event”, we can still say that the ground of all correspondences is the “escape” in 
the sense that whatever we say becoming, surface, sense, the result is not to “hold” 
the event. It always escapes. Events are “not what occurs” but are “rather inside what 
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occurs” (LS, 149). They are always in between (between object and subject, between 
actuality and potentiality, between proposition and thing…).  
 
The position of Event in The Logic of Sense can be taken as the particular instance of 
Being in Deleuze’s philosophy. Events (with a lower-case “e”) “communicate in one 
and the same Event” (LS, 53). In other words, events share Event. They are the “bits 
and pieces” of the Event, which Deleuze calls “the paradoxical instance . . . in which 
all events communicate and are distributed” (LS, 56). Event is “[e]ventum tantum for 
all events, the ultimate form for all of the forms which remain disjointed in it, but 
which bring about the resonance and the ramification of their disjunction” (LS, 179).  
 
3.1.3 Material / Actual World 
For Deleuze everything is material. However, philosophy is not the science that 
explains one matter with another matter or with material experiments. Philosophy 
explains material by creating concepts that belong to a transcendental field and a 
transcendental field consists of sensitive points, in what Deleuze calls ‘singularities’ 
or ‘anti-generalities’ (LS, 99).  
 
In the schema that Piercey postulates, material and actual worlds correspond to each 
other in the sense that the material world is the actualization of the virtual. However, 
Deleuze’s theory takes the risk of a hierarchical reading in which the material world 
or the actual world is at the bottom. Virtuality as the term from ‘outside’ of material 
world can be thought as appropriation difference and creation. That is the point that 
Hardt notes.  “Bergson’s discussion is very strong in analyzing the unfolding of the 
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virtual in the actual - what Deleuze calls the process of ‘differenciation’ or 
actualization. In this regard, Bergson is a philosopher of the emanation of being, and 
the Platonic resonances are very strong” (Hardt, 15-16). We must be aware that as I 
discussed before within “Bergson’s (Affirmative) Ontology of Difference”, this 
actualization is not the occurrence of the possible, but rather the occurrence of virtual 
difference. In other words, the relation between actual and virtual is differentiation, 
not a hierarchical postulation. Hardt says, “[t]his [Deleuze’s] material correction is 
not an inversion of the priority, but the proposition of an equality in principle 
between corporeal and the intellectual [or between actual and virtual]” (Hardt, 74). 
Actual and virtual overlap.  
The virtual is the future-past of the present: a thing’s destiny and, 
condition of existence. ... A thing’s actuality is its duration as a 
process/of genesis and annihilation, of movement across 
thresholds and toward the limit. The virtual is real and in 
reciprocal presupposition with the actual, but does not exist even 
to the extent that the actual could be said to exist. It subsists in the 
actual or is immanent to it. (Massumi, 36-37) 
 
Then, we can talk on Deleuze’s radical materialism that shows itself with 
transcendental empiricism and can be named as virtual materialism.  That is the point 
that some Deleuze commentators reject, such as Peter Hallward in Out of this World: 
Deleuze. According to him, the place of virtuality in Deleuze’s philosophy is 
completely alien to material reality in the sense that Deleuze’s philosophy of creation 
belongs to the field of the virtual, not the field of representation.17 I think there is a 
confusion of representation and the material reality in Hallward’s interpretation. He 
is right for saying that philosophy of representation is the main enemy for Deleuze, 
but the material world is not the field of representation. Deleuze’s recasting of 
                                               
17
 See, Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, Verso, 2006, 
p.25-40.  
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materiality in terms of change is that material existence is always in the 
multidimensional movements and the perception is the point that transports them to 
representation. In other words, representation is related to perception, not to material 
world and because of that, Deleuze insists on the insufficiency of perception.   
 
3.1.4 Difference as Connection 
Although Deleuze’s comments and studies on the notion of difference in the history 
of philosophy constitute his principal themes on the notion of difference, they are not 
the final point for Deleuzian difference. They are rather some themes of the concept 
of difference. It is not difficult to comprehend the importance of “difference” for a 
philosopher if he wrote that “difference is behind everything, but behind difference 
there is nothing” (DR, 57). Moreover, the concept of difference as such (not the 
conceptual difference) is the core of his plane of immanence in the sense of being a 
part of explanations in all fields of philosophy. What I am interested in this part is to 
show that the notion of difference in his philosophy is not difference as separation, 
but difference as connections that open a path for ontology of “And” in the sense that 
ontology is an “and”. What I call as ontology of “And”, in other words, is constituted 
immanently by the principle of difference as connections. 
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze proposes an immanent analysis of ontological 
difference. According to him, first of all, the difference is an “and” in its occurrence. 
It lies always between two repetitions. Difference is “between the levels or degrees 
of a repetition which is total and totalizing” (DR, 287). It is “a secret subject” within 
two repetitions.  
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We are right to speak of repetition when we find ourselves confronted 
by identical elements with exactly the same concept. However, we 
must distinguish between these discrete elements, these repeated 
objects, and a secret subject, the real subject of repetition, which 
repeats itself through them. Repetition must be understood in the 
pronominal. (DR, 23) 
 
 
Difference is between the secret repetition associated with Being and the repetition of 
the same element associated with the empirical world. The field of difference should 
be distinguished from both because it is a “transcendental field which does not 
resemble the corresponding empirical fields, and which nevertheless is not confused 
with an undifferentiated depth” (LS, 102).  
 
“In accordance with Heidegger’s ontological intuition”, he writes, “difference must 
be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without 
any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the 
possessed” (DR, 117). In other words, the different is related to difference through 
difference itself in the sense that difference is the state in which we can talk of 
determination as such. Then, the relations of differences are external to their terms. 
That is the virtual content of multiplicity and is named differentiation. On the other 
hand, according to Deleuze, the world can be thought as connections of differences. 
That is the articulation of the multiplicity in particular species and is named 
differenciation. “Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as 
problem, differenciation expresses the articulation of this virtual and the constitution 
of solutions… Differenciation is the second of difference, and in order to designate 
the integrity or the integrality of the object, we require the complex notion of 
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different/ciation” (Ibid, 209). The world, in other words, is no longer taken as being 
composed of discrete units. Instead a notion of difference becomes the condition for 
phenomena. All entities “share” difference. Deleuze wants to say, paradoxically, that 
the only “ground” entities have in common is the lack of a common ground. The 
activity of difference is virtue for everything. But this difference is not between 
already demarcated signifiers (it is not a semiotic), rather it is a difference in 
intensity:  
“Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. 
Every diversity and every change refers to a difference which is its 
sufficient reason. Everything which happens and everything which appears 
is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, 
pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity”… Difference is not 
diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is 
given, that by which the given is given as diverse. Difference is not 
phenomenon but the nuomenon closest to the phenomenon (Ibid, 222).   
 
Then, difference must be acknowledged as an object of affirmation in which it is a 
condition for the given of the sensible manifold and the differential connections have 
the same scope. In other words, the path that the notion of difference opens for 
connections does not belong to the representation of the world, but to a 
transcendental field that accounts for the conditions of the real. Deleuze introduces 
the virtual connection that is the critique of spatio-temporal isolation.  
 
3.2 Conclusion  
 
a) In this chapter, I investigated Deleuze’s general concepts on ontology, which are 
dealt with in The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition.  Although these two 
books include the examination of traditional problems in ontology, it is out of 
traditional ontology. In other words, DeLanda places Deleuze’s ontology into realist 
tradition, and as I discussed above, for this placement, he postulates a hierarchical 
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and causal relation between nuomenon and phenomenon in Deleuze’s ontology. 
However, the relation between them is not causality or hierarchy, but it is rather 
inequality. Deleuze’s ontology suggests triad parts as Piercey shows. These are, in 
general, Being, actual and virtual. Being corresponds to Event in LS and to good or 
secret repetition in DR. Virtual corresponds to events in LS and to difference in DR. 
Actual corresponds to the material world in LS and to bad repetition in DR.  
 
Although Deleuze’s philosophy emphasizes becoming, he does not reject the 
function of Being. For Deleuze, Being is a need in ontology. It is not a deep or 
hidden foundation, but a paradox that appears between language and voice. It is the 
border and ground of ontology and advices an immanent and materialist ontology. In 
other words, Being is not explanatory for being, but it is the sameness of ground for 
all beings.  
 
Unlike Being, virtuality is explanatory part, but not for material world. It respects to 
behind of material world, but not beyond of it. It means virtuality and material world 
have bidirectional relation with each other. In Deleuze’s philosophy, the concept of 
difference and events are main examples of this relation. Difference is the condition 
of diversity of material world. In other words, to say that there is a manifold in 
material world is to say that difference actualizes in material world. However, events 
are results of material world: “incorporeal results of corporeal (or state of affairs)”. 
As I sampled above, to slice an apple is a process, and although it is a result of state 
of affairs (such as a knife and apple, etc.), we need an alternative way to state of 
affairs in order to understand events in the sense that as a process or becoming, 
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events move not only to the future, but also to the past. It moves to both directions 
simultaneously. Then, virtuality includes both the results of material world and 
condition of material world. Moreover, although virtuality is not explanation for 
material world, it can not be taken independently from it. In summary, Deleuze’s 
ontology offers virtual materialism restricted with Being.  
 
b) The concept of difference essentially involves constructing connections in an 
experimental or empirical fashion. In other words, theoretical motifs of difference are 
useful to distinguish things, but not to separate them. It is rather to distinguish them 
to connect each other. This is really an opaque point in Deleuze’s philosophy, but it 
is also a necessary connection point between Deleuze’s independent writings and his 
collaborations with Guattari.  According to Deleuze, ontology of difference takes the 
uniqueness of things as a process. Differences of things are not their stable property, 
but rather their process. They take their differences again and again. For example, 
each person is unique among human beings. This uniqueness is his/her becoming or 
changing. S/he is unique in the process of becoming. Everything is unique in each 
time with returning of difference. Then, difference is a way of connecting things with 
what they are not yet to come. It is ‘a sufficient reason’ for connection. This means 
the future is an actualization of difference. The differential relationships or 
connections determine happenings. However, this does not mean that everything can 
happen, but rather it means that there must be right connections for something to 
happen, and the next chapter will be about how the connection occurs ontologically 
and what the connection means. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ONTOLOGY OF “AND”: ONTOLOGY OF MACHINES 
 
If difference is deeper than identity, if actualization is a result of the virtual, if 
multiplicity is immanent to our world, then Deleuze introduces an ontology where 
what is there is not the same old things, but a process of continual change, an 
ontology that does not seek to reduce “being” to the knowable but instead seeks to 
widen thought to palpate “becoming” (May, 2005, 171). The notions of “change” and 
“becoming” have correspondence to the notion of “connection” in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy in the sense that whatever changes is a result of connections. In 
other words, the new is a result of connections of olds. And in the process of 
becoming, we can not indicate a unit, there are always units: becoming is the 
multiplicity of connections between units. 
 
Although the concept of difference and Deleuze’s general ontology indicates 
ontological connections (changes), Deleuze’s collaborations with Guattari elaborates 
and enlarges the questions of connections. It is more accurate to say that the concepts 
within this collaboration accomplish the same task with Deleuze’s individual works, 
but take the problem of connectivity in a new form. This form appears with the 
rhizome which suggests seeing the world from the middle and this form takes its full 
meaning with the concept of machine which eludes ontological iron between things 
and being and relates everything to a machine in which it operates. In this chapter, 
my aim is to investigate the possibility and the meaning of ontology of connection or 
ontology of “and” with respect to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.  
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4.1 Rhizome: Introduction to Ontology  of “And” 
Everything moves as if the pleats of matter possessed no reason in themselves. It is 
because the Fold is always between two folds, and because the between-two-folds 
seems to move about everywhere: It is between inorganic bodies and organisms, 
between organisms and animal souls, between animal souls and reasonable souls, 
between bodies and souls in general.                                                  Gilles Deleuze  
 
 
Rhizome is an introduction, but not a beginning. It is an introduction of ‘nomad 
thought’ because there is no conclusion in it. It is not beginning, because it is always 
in between. It names a principle of connectivity, nullifies endings and beginnings. It 
is always between different milieus that are usually thought of as discrete-fields.  It is 
proliferating. It is ‘a theory and practice of relations, of the ‘And’’ (D, 15). There is 
no centre of origin in it, what exists is only the in-between. It is insurgent crowds, 
such as the crowds in Sergei Eisenstein's October (also known as Ten Days that 
Shook The World), in which the images that belong to  revolutionary masses 
flurrying, surging, overflowing, etc., in every way show a rhizomatic existence. In 
other words, movements of crowds in October are impulsive, spontaneous and 
haphazard motions as the characteristic of rhizome.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari offer the characteristics of rhizome as follows: 
Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike 
trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, 
and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it 
brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign 
states. The rhizome is reducible to neither the One nor the multiple. It 
is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five etc. 
It is not a multiple derived from the one, or to which one is added 
(n+1). It is comprised not of units but of dimensions, or rather 
directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a 
middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills. It 
constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither 
subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, 
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and from which the one is always subtracted (n-1). When a 
multiplicity of this kind changes dimension, it necessarily changes in 
nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. Unlike a structure, which 
is defined by a set of points and positions, the rhizome is made only 
of lines; lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and 
the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension 
after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in 
nature. These lines, or ligaments, should not be confused with 
lineages of the arborescent type, which are merely localizable 
linkages between points and positions...Unlike the graphic arts, 
drawing or photography, unlike tracings, the rhizome pertains to a 
map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always 
detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple 
entryways and exits and its own lines of flight. (ATP, 21) 
 
With rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari offer an ‘acentered’ way of doing philosophy. 
As with Foucault’s concept of ‘heterotopia’, the rhizome constitutes heterogeneous 
components in serial ways. However, although it is antimetaphysical, it is not 
concerned with bankrupting metaphysics. Rhizome, in other words, appears at the 
toehold of the philosophical discourse in its silence, but it is not a silence. The 
problem is the formations of thought in which the tree is the way to understand the 
world: “[a]ll of arborescent culture is founded on them [trees, roots and radicles], 
from biology to linguistics” (ATP, 15). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
concept of the system has changed, rather than the system. Unlike the tree, the 
rhizome introduces the serial relationship, but the system is the same. Although today 
it is said that metaphysics is dead, Deleuze and Guattari caution that whenever 
concepts are created, the metaphysics folds them in its scope (WP, 9). In that case, 
we must be aware that they criticize metaphysics, but they do not declare its death.  
Then, the question is not whether rhizome is metaphysical or not, but how it 
functions in the system.  
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When Deleuze (and Guattari) write that “[t]he tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and…and…and…’’, they do criticize all 
formations of thought that are based on the verb ‘to be” (ATP, 25). The notion of 
‘And’ is an iconoclastic expression. It says that there is not a world, but worlds, there 
is not a way of seeing or postulating it, but ways. Deleuze wants to show that ‘to be’ 
is not simply an empty term that must be supplemented by a series of different ‘to be 
an X’ (Williams, 67). The ‘and’ replaces the cosmos with the chaotic. However, the 
chaotic has also setting-out. In Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, the multiplicity is 
not something that is given. It is something that must be done (n-1). In this respect, 
the rhizome introduces the seeing from the middle, which is different in nature. 
Although it seems easy from the theoretical point of view, ‘it is not easy to see things 
in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up, at them from 
below, or from left to right or right to left…’ (ATP, 23). The ‘And’ conjoins, but not 
as an instrument for introducing either unity or quandary among entities or terms. It 
means the ‘hyphen’, not a hierarchy or a closed totality. 
And even if there are only two terms, there is an AND between the 
two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which 
becomes the other, but which constitutes the multiplicity. This is 
why it is always possible to undo dualism from the inside, by tracing 
the line of the flight which passes between the terms or the two sets, 
the narrow stream which belongs neither to one nor the other, but 
draws both into a non-parallel evolution, into a heterochronous 
becoming. (D, 34-35) 
 
AND is of course diversity, multiplicity, the destruction of 
identities. [...] But diversity and multiplicity have nothing to do with 
aesthetic wholes [...] or dialectical schemas [...] When Godard says 
everything has two parts, that in a day there's morning and evening, 
he's not saying it's one or the other, or that one becomes the other, 
becomes two. Because multiplicity is never in the terms, however 
many, nor in all the terms together, the whole. Multiplicity is 
precisely in the 'and', which is different in nature from elementary 
components and collections of them. (N, 44) 
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These expressions do not only belong to the explanation of the ‘And’, but also they 
are exemplifications for it. It is not, in other words, the chance that Deleuze uses the 
‘And’ mainly in the dialogues, in the conversations and in the collaborations with 
Guattari. These works are homeless. They occur in the space of the ‘And’ and we 
must read them as the ‘And’ between Deleuze and the others. As Deleuze and 
Guattari commence ATP by stating: “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. 
Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd… Why we kept our 
own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in 
turn… To reach, not the point that where one no longer says I, but the point where it 
is no longer of any importance whether one says I” (ATP, 3).  Moreover, ATP does 
not introduce an organic whole in the sense that “[e]ach plateau can be read starting 
anywhere and related to any other plateau” (ATP, 22).  
 
The rhizome is a critique of ontology. (ATP, 25) Moreover, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, the rhizome overthrows ontology. (Ibid) That is the point that creates 
the debate among their commentators. For instance, Rajchman argues that Deleuze's 
thought ‘puts experimentation before ontology, ‘And’ before ‘Is’’ (Rajchman, 6).18 
Rajchman is right in the sense of conformism that the ontology of “is” promotes. The 
conformism is also the reason of Foucault and Derrida’s rejection of ontology. They 
are right to reject conformism, but they do not need to reject ontology. As May says, 
the conformity appears in the ontology of identity which dominates ontological 
postulations since Plato. However, “rather than jettisoning ontology, Deleuze gives it 
                                               
18
 However, I must add that ‘The Deleuze Connections’ is still a book on Deleuze’s ontology. 
Although it does not use and does not accept the term ontology, it takes Deleuzian notions and 
concepts into the ontological space.  
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a new meaning” (May, 2005, 171).   In other words, what rhizome overthrows is the 
investigation of ‘is’ and ‘either/or’ that makes a catalogue of beings, but not the 
investigation of existence with the ‘And’. In that respect, the notion of rhizome can 
be taken as a different midway that opens the ontological postulations without 
introducing an end in them. In other words, in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, the 
need to investigate ontology is to modify ontology on the basis of ontological 
questions. If the question is ‘how one exists’ or ‘how one might live’, then in 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophy, the answer takes the form of posing new 
questions. This is the probabilistic attitude of questions. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
existence is rhizomatic, but its representation is not. The existence of something is 
never by itself, but always through the mediation of another. This means that ‘[a]ny 
point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other; and must be’ and each 
connection is the new question (ATP, p. 7). The ‘And’ opens up a questioning of the 
relation between the two terms or adds a space between them, while the ‘Is’ is the 
forgetting of the between.  The question must be “openness”. There is the objective 
power of the question and for Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, modern 
ontology “suffers from failures,” for it fails to recognize this power (DR, 196). As 
Lawlor comments on Deleuze’s criticism, “[m]odern ontology continues to conceive 
the question either in terms of a provisional vagueness in a human subject, which an 
answer comes to fulfill, or in terms of an interiority which can never be fulfilled” 
(Lawlor, 99). Then, rhizome is a criticism of such ontology in the sense that 
rhizomatic thought does not have “a human subject” and it is full exteriority instead 
of interiority. This means it is the notion of the rhizome, a discipline of the ‘And’ 
type, that introduces the new method(s) of doing ontology.  
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4.2 Machine: Ontology of ‘And’ 
Machines speak to machines before speaking to man, and the 
ontological domains that they reveal and secrete are, at each 
occurrence, singular and precarious.    Felix Guattari 
 
The concept of difference (as Deleuze employs it before his collaborations with 
Guattari) and the concept of machine (as Deleuze and Guattari develop it) have 
similar aspects and works in the same line of philosophy. That is the line of 
multiplicity or becoming, and the concept of machine can be thought continuous with 
the concept of difference. It is in fact a different postulation of it. Although Deleuze 
commentators take the concept of difference as an ontological one, most of them 
refuse the concept of machine as such.  I think the reason is their considering 
ontology in the traditional sense, according to which ontological arguments or 
postulations are of the kind “what exists” and “what being is”.  The concept of 
difference can be put to work in such a traditional context. Regardless of the fact that 
difference is connection, it is open to working on the side of general/traditional 
ontological problems. However, the notions of connection elude this kind of 
question. “That which makes a machine, to be precise, are connections” (K, 82).  
 
Machine is the name of rhizomatic connection within production. We must add that 
the notion of the production is what machine introduces. The notion of production is 
the point where the concept of machine offers ontology of ‘and’ and ontology as 
‘and’. In other words, if one takes ontology in an extremely rigorous sense, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy has realized itself as ontology in the sense that ontology is 
the ground of philosophy within the concept of machine. The machine is the source 
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of a new ontology of connection and assemblages, which in turn opens up the 
creation of new modes of life and thought.  
 
Why is machine, in the first place, ontological?  
“For Deleuze and Guattari, ontology is neither generically 
liberating, nor generically oppressive. It is not about discovering 
some pre-technological ontology which has been repressed in 
modern society that would potentially restore freedom. Nor is 
ontology a fixed and rigidified form which would subjugate 
(women for example) to fixed and invariable modes of being. 
Deleuze and Guattari offer a Spinozist inspired conception of 
ontology.” (Lort, Robert. “Rhizomatic Ontologies”) 
 
What Spinoza introduces, in that case, is the function of beings or bodies as 
ontologies and its state of conforming within Deleuze’s philosophy is that “[b]odies 
are not defined by their genus or species, by their organs and functions, but by what 
they can do, by the affects of which they are capable - in passion as well as in action” 
(D, p. 60). And the function can be defined bodies’ (or ontological entities’) 
assemblages and relations. It is a move towards notions and/or questions of function, 
rather than notions and/or questions of definition: not “What is it?” or “What thing or 
idea does it represent?” but “What does it do?” or “What does it become?” In other 
words, what Deleuze and Guattari introduce and take as ontology is the connection 
and the assemblages as production. Production is the production of machine and 
machine is itself a production within flows. Therefore, unlike difference, there is no 
machine as in itself in their philosophy. . And, I think this ontology can be named as 
machine.  
 
Independently from collaborations with Deleuze, Guattari particularly offers 
assiduous attention to machines and machinic assemblages in his own writings, in 
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which the world is rethought as a collection of machines, or more accurately a 
collection of machinic assemblages (OM). This is not the technical or industrial 
meaning of machines that introduces machines as the object of our experience, but 
rather it is introduced as a kind of key concept with which one sees the world 
through of expanded connectivity.19 The technological machine is only one instance 
of machinism. There are also technical, aesthetic, economic, social, etc. machines. 
According to Guattari, the term of machine is, first of all, the opening of new ways 
to ontology in the sense of “trying to break down the ontological iron curtain 
between being and things” (OM, 8). In other words, there is no ontological iron 
between nature and human being (in fact, for Spinoza, the human condition is 
generally one of passivity, reaction and determination from external forces).  
 
The concept of machine does not reject separation, but it separates them to connect.  
Then, what we need is the translation of being and things to their machinic 
connections. That is what Butler argues: “the difference between the life of man and 
that of a machine is one rather of degree than of kind” (Butler, 219). However, in 
Butler’s argument, there is still a curtain between “life of man” and that of machine. 
This curtain is our alienated understanding and/or consciousness that the core of 
Spinoza’s criticism and rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism with one 
immanent substance. Moreover, from Kantian aesthetics through to Marxist 
revolutionary practical application, this curtain is the subject struggled to defeat. For 
                                               
19
 Guattari writes that “[i]n the history of philosophy the problem of the machine is generally 
considered a secondary component of a more general question, that of the techne, the techniques. Here 
I would like to propose a reversal of the view in which the problem of technique is a part of a much 
more extensive machine issue. This 'machine' is open to the outside and its machinic environment and 
maintains all kinds of relationships to social components and individual subjectivities. It is hence a 
matter of expanding the concept of the technological machine into one of the machinic assemblage...” 
(OM, 11) 
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Guattari, it is not so much a manner of defeating alienation, but rather of reordering 
ourselves and our relationship with the world, a manner of reconfiguration. This 
means machine does not refer to either being or things. In fact, beings, such as 
human being, and things will only arise as effects or products of machinic relations. 
Then, machine entails a break in our habitual sense of self and in our habitual 
responses to the world and remapping them. Our habitual sense forces us to 
recognition, but Guattari and Deleuze offers new ways to encounter and affirmation 
of new ways. 20  
 
Guattari’s work at La Borde as it is explained in Chaosmois is an instance of 
remapping the world, in which his aim is to show what he calls ‘resingularisation’, 
the ability individuals have to creatively remap their world. He explains such 
experimentation as follows:  
 
Certain psychotic patients, coming from poor agricultural 
backgrounds, will be invited to take up plastic arts, drama, video, 
music, etc., whereas until then, these universes had been unknown 
to them. On the other hand, bureaucrats and intellectuals will find 
themselves attracted to material work, in the kitchen, garden, 
pottery, horse riding club. The important thing here is not only the 
confrontation with a new material of expression, but the 
constitution of complexes of subjectivation: multiple exchanges 
between individual-group-machine. These complexes actually offer 
people diverse possibilities for recomposing their essential 
corporeality, to get out of their repetitive impasses and, in a certain 
way, to resingularise themselves. Grafts of transcendence operative 
in this way, not issuing from ready-made dimensions of subjectivity 
crystallised into structural complexes, but from a creation which 
itself indicates a kind of aesthetic paradigm. One creates new 
modalities of subjectivity in the same way an artist creates new 
forms from a palette. (C, 6-7)    
 
                                               
20
 This is the point that the aesthetic project or side is immanent to machine as Deleuze and Guattari 
describe it in the sense that art might be involved in enabling the ‘new’ kinds of relations with the 
world.   
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The emergence of crosswise interactions between people, and between people and 
things is not, for Guattari, a cure for psychotic or neurotic patients or does not carry 
the aim of a reintegration of them back into society. It rather aims that individuals 
can resingularise, or reorganize, their beings in an ontologically creative, affirmative, 
and self-organizing manner. The assemblage, and like rhizome, as well as having an 
internal consistency or cohesion (the production of a territory) is spreading out 
external lines or openness (a deterritorilisation) or connection with an outside. In that 
respect, according to Guattari, machines and machinic assemblages do not belong 
only to cities, but also to the rituals of archaic societies (OM, 11). 
 
In Anti Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari begin with stating that everything is machine, 
or to be more precise, every machine is a machine of a machine: “[e]verywhere it is 
machines-real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, being 
driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections…. We 
are all handymen: each with his little machines” (AO, 1). This means the concept of 
machine is not a selection, not a result. It describes the existence or the term/concept 
machine is not a metaphorical one (AO, 2). The statement that everything is machine 
is not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under one concept but rather of 
relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations, as Deleuze puts it (N, 
31). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari describes the concept of machine as escaping from the 
Lacanian notion of the ‘subject’ in the sense that as they argue if machine is ‘being 
driven by other machine’, the notion of subject (and object in some sense) disappears 
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in the concept of machine; however, we can still talk on subject-machine and on 
nomadic subject in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophies. A machinic remapping is 
deliverance of subject and object from their fixed sense, both being changes in 
channels of continuous interaction and communication between different kinds of 
machinic assemblages.  
In fact, normally we would say that the subject that operates the 
machine is human and the object that the machine transforms is nature. 
Think of the way a human subject might use a bulldozer or a chainsaw. 
The human subject directs the machine to modify the natural object: to 
move dirt or cut wood. Now, this is not at all D&G's conception of 
machines. The machines here have no subject and no object, or at least 
not a natural object....[There is no intelligence that stands behind them 
and directs their operation. (Hardt, Reading Notes) 
 
In that respect, we must be aware of that the criticism of the notion of subject is not 
only the machine itself, but the relation of machines. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe a machine as a cut, a crack, or “a system of interruptions or breaks” within 
contiguity as the condition of such contiguity. Contiguity and break seem opposed if 
considered in the abstract, outside of experience, but machine brings these two 
movements into conjunction. Machine is to coalesce in the act of division. It is not 
only the name of the object of the break, but also the name of the break itself, and 
indeed it is what is produced by the break. It is what machines are made of; it is what 
machines are.  
 A machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks 
(coupures). These breaks should in no way be considered as a 
separation from reality; rather, they operate along lines that vary 
according to whatever aspect of them we are considering. Every 
machine, in the first place, is related to a continual material flow 
(hyle) that cuts into…. Far from being opposite of continuity, the 
break or interruption conditions this continuity. This is because, as 
we have seen every machine is a machine of machine. The machine 
produces an interruption of the flow only insofar as it is connected 
to another machine that supposedly produces this flow. And 
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doubtless this second machine in turn is really an interruption or 
break too. But it is such only in relationship to a third machine…. 
(“and then… and then… and then…”)….That is the law of 
production of production. That is why, at the limit point of all the 
transverse or transfinite connections, the partial object and the 
continuous flux, the interruption and the connection, fuse into 
one….(AO, 36-37).  
 
 
Therefore, there can never be a starting point and an ending point for the machinic 
process, but there is a notion of “one” in machinic process that means all the 
connections of machines, and from this point the notion of “one” is still pure 
inherence in machinic process. “The whole not only exists as a product that is 
produced apart from them and yet at the same time is related to them” (AO, 43-44). 
Again and again, Deleuze and Guattari denote Spinozian One to which everything is 
immanent.  
 
 
Before Deleuze and Guattari, Cartesian mechanistic thought describes the world as 
machines, but not in an immanent way in the sense that in Cartesian dualism, 
machines are subject to the external transcendence. Human machine have a requisite 
for a soul in order to be what it is. Mechanism presupposes an exteriority of 
machines, but for Deleuze and Guattari there is no external point for machines in the 
sense that everything is machine and which is defined as pure externality. In other 
words, a machine is relations or connections between machines. 
 
In defining machine, it is necessary to distinguish it from the related but different 
concepts or definitions by showing the relations of them with the concept of machine 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. In that respect, let’s investigate two close 
concepts that are organism and mechanism. 
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In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari 
use a terminology of machines, assemblages, connections and 
productions…. An organism is a bounded whole with an identity 
and an end. A mechanism is a closed machine with a specific 
function. A machine, however, is nothing more than its 
connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything, and has 
no closed identity. (Colebrook, 56)  
 
Within an organism, the parts are adherents of each other. The whole is the harmony 
of its parts. Parts are only roles in the whole. However, in that case, I think 
biological entities can not be taken as organisms and they are not the description of 
organism in Deleuzian & Guattarian sense.  If we say with their words, “[t]he enemy 
is the organism....The judgment of God, the system of the judgment of God, the 
theological system, is precisely the operation of He who makes an organism” (ATP, 
158). Biological entities can connect with the different aspects of environment. They 
can nourish with different things, they can nest in different environments and they 
can be eaten by different biological entities (May, 2005, 122). Then, biological 
entities are more close to machines than organism, at least, within the definition of it 
by Colebrook. Moreover, the contrast view to Colebrook on machines and 
organisms can be argued as Georges Canguilhem did in his famous lecture, Machine 
& Organism. According to him, an organism has a greater range of activity than a 
machine. It is less bound to purposiveness and more open to potentialities. Every 
aspect and every moment of a machine is calculated; and the working of machine 
confirms how each calculation connected to certain norms, measures or estimates, 
whereas the living body actions according to experience (Canguilhem, 57).  
 
Canguilhem’s postulation of machine is not Deleuzian & Guattarian one. 
Nevertheless, although Deleuze and Guattari take the machine out of the factory, he 
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takes the machine as the technological apparatus and offers a biological philosophy 
of technology. However, I think he is right on the notion of organism. Experience is 
not a structural unity and within the unexpected changes of experience, organisms as 
biological entities can not be taken as calculated one. Also, experience is the point 
that an organism relates to another; “Are you experienced? Have you ever been 
experienced?”21 Regardless of the fact that Colebrook and Canguilhem have set 
views in opposition in order to show or emphasize differences between machine and 
organism, the important point is what they support. That is the meaning of machine 
as Deleuze and Guattari have postulated.  
 
Machine is not reducible to mechanism. Mechanism serves to designate specific 
processes in certain technological or technical machines, or else a specific 
organization of a living being. However, in terms of the question of technology, there 
is no reification of technical machines in the work of Deleuze and Guattari since they 
readily appreciate that technical machines are only indexes of more complex 
assemblages. Before technical machine, social machine determines what the usage, 
extension, and comprehension of technical elements are. “[Technical machines] do 
not in fact contain the conditions for the reproduction of their process; they point to 
the social machines that condition and organize them, but also limit and inhibit their 
development” (AO, 141).22 There is no technology in itself.  
 
                                               
21
 Jimi Hendrix, Song: Are You Experienced? Album: Are You Experienced? 
22
 Also, it is possible that a machine is both technical and social from different perspectives. “[F]or 
example, the clock as a technical machine for measuring uniform time, and as a social machine for 
reproducing canonic hours and for assuring order in the city” (AO, 141).  
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Machinism is totally different from mechanism, it is any system that interrupts flows, 
and it goes beyond both the mechanism of technology and the organization of the 
living being, whether in nature, society, or human beings (DES, 129). No one doubts 
that if something is mechanic, each movement contains all other movements. In other 
words, when mechanic thing pushes something, it must move. Movement penetrates 
all things to which it touches. On the contrary, for a machine, it is not necessary that 
all parts work together. The machine is not just the totality of its parts. It is possible 
that some parts work and others do not. In Dialogues, mechanics is defined as the 
system of closer and closer connections between dependent units or terms, but the 
machine is a proximity grouping between independent and heterogeneous terms 
whether humans are among its parts or not (D, 125). Therefore, machine is more 
complex than mechanic, but this does not mean that mechanism can be understood 
directly.  May offers a suggestive relation between them. He writes that: 
 
They [mechanisms] are machines caught at a particular movement 
in time, in the seeming solidity of particular connections. 
Mechanisms are machines seen from the viewpoint of the present 
instant, machines seen spatially in Bergson’s sense. Mechanisms 
are the actualization of machines. Our perception may encounter 
mechanisms, but our thought must penetrate those mechanisms in 
order to discover the machines within them (May, 2005, 123). 
 
  
In that respect, Colebrook offers this example. “Think of a bicycle, which obviously 
has no ‘end’ or intention. It only works when it is connected with another ‘machine’ 
such as the human body…. But we could imagine different connections producing 
different machines. The cycle becomes an art object when placed in a gallery; the 
human body becomes an ‘artist’ when connected paintbrush” (Colebrook, 56). We 
can see many machines in this example, such as the bicycle, the human body, the 
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gallery, the bicycle-body, the bicycle-gallery, etc. Each of them has a series of 
connections that create the machine; for example, the bicycle-body machine has a 
set of foot-to-pedal-connection, hand-to-handlebar connection, and rear-end-to-seat 
connection. Another way of saying this, machine is applied not only to bicycle, but 
also to parts of it and to other things for which bicycle becomes a part.  
 
 
Then, the machinic ontology has two sides. One is machine as production and this 
means the parts of a machine produce machine within the relation among them. 
Another is machine’s production and this means the relation of each machine. 
Moreover, these two sides are paradoxically within each machine. The paradox 
appears in the sense that the machine moves in two directions simultaneously, like 
the paradox of becoming or changing in Deleuze’s philosophy. According to 
Deleuze, when a thing changes or becomes something else, it can be thought of as 
moving in two directions: toward its future state and away from its past state. 
Deleuze uses the example of something growing in size: in the future, it's larger, and 
in the past, it's smaller. The essence of becoming is its moving in these two 
directions simultaneously, and while we may use “good sense” to impose a direction 
on it (such as to speak of it as "growing" or "shrinking"), it is the nature of paradox 
to be aware of both directions at the same time (LS, 1). In this sense, Plato 
distinguishes being (static/discrete/quantum) from fluid becoming. This is the 
Platonic dualism on which Deleuze wants to focus rather than the classic idea (or 
form)/matter dualism, or real/copy (simulacra) dualism. For Plato, the fluid 
becoming can never "complete" and can never become a static end. (Matter, no 
matter how much perfection it has, can never become a Platonic form.) The Platonic 
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idea (form) is only applied to being. This means becoming eludes present. In that 
respect, mechanistic point of view is a kind of “good sense” and the concept of 
machine, like becoming, needs another way of thinking. That rejects separate units 
and introduces the connections and the assemblages within the flow.  
 
Another point is that everything is machine(s), but there is no machine. There is 
subject-machine, art-machine, affect-machine, growing-machine, abstract-machine, 
social-machine, etc, but not a machine-machine. Machines are always machines of 
machines, “assemblages” forming and reproducing a network. Machine is on what 
makes something X-machine(s), or it is what is shared by the things that exist in the 
machinic relations. However, it is also not a form or idea in the sense that it does not 
condition the existence; it does not include the properties or the production of X-
machine(s). If we relate it to the Deleuze’s earlier ontological concepts, machine has 
a virtual field or there are virtual machines, such as abstract machine.  This means 
the relation of machines has an order although it does not control them. In other 
words, there is no machine-machine as the condition of X-machine(s). In that 
respect, we can use the relation between virtual and actual (in some sense) for the 
explanation of machinic relations and to introduce abstract machine. However, if 
everything is machine(s) and neither “everything is virtual” nor “everything is 
actual”, I think the relation between virtual and actual, as I described before, is only 
one side of the relation of X-machine(s). Also, the actualization of virtuality is not 
useful for X-machine(s) in some sense because for instance a social-machine is not 
an ‘actual’ becoming in Deleuze’s sense, but a growing-machine is an actual 
becoming in some sense. I used “in some sense” because the notion of actuality is 
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still incomplete for a growing-machine. In other words, there is a distinction that 
what we call as growing and a growing-machine. Growing is becoming as I 
described and it can be understood only in the relation with shrinking. And a 
growing-machine is also in the relation with a shrinking-machine. The distinction 
between these two postulations is the definition of the machine with production, 
whereas becoming does not directly designate the production. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that these two different terminologies or descriptions on existence are 
contrary to each other. Both criticize the philosophical thought of representation in 
different points with postulating thought beyond representation. 
 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology, some concepts and machines are 
primary for machinic production. In the sense that, machinic ontology can be 
articulated not only in terms of the multiplicity of actualizations, but also of the 
‘‘whole’’ of the conditions by which multiplicity occurs. Then, three main concepts 
are abstract machine, desiring machine and body without organs. Roughly, all of 
them function as the plane of consistency for machinic production.  
 
4.2.1 Abstract Machine 
The concept of abstract machine seems as the opposite of what I argued lastly that 
there is no machine-machine. It is virtual machine and each machinic assemblage 
can be taken as indicated by an abstract machine that indicates its capacity for 
coming into existence. However, I think it must be thought as the necessary 
perversion of the machines. When we describe machine, the notions of function and 
matter are necessary, but they are always formed matters and formal functions 
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within the relation of machines. Then, “[a]bstract machines consist of unformed 
matters and non-formal functions” (ATP, 511). This means each abstract machine is 
a plateau, a vector for the relation of machines without conditioning the relations. 
“[I]t is inseparable from what happens: it is the “non-inside” living vitality of 
matter” (Zepke, 2).  
 
 
It is worth quoting at length from Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the relation 
between an assemblage and an abstract machine: 
 
We must therefore arrive at something in the assemblage itself that 
is still more profound than these sides [i.e. the expression side and 
the content side] and can account for both of the forms in 
presupposition, forms of expression or regimes of signs (semiotic 
systems) and forms of content or regimes of bodies (physical 
systems). This is what we call the abstract machine, which 
constitutes and conjugates all of the assemblage’s cutting edges of 
deterritorialization. [...] The abstract machine [...] makes no 
distinction within itself between content and expression, even 
though outside itself it presides over that distinction and distributes 
it in strata, domains, and territories. An abstract machine in itself is 
not physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic; it is 
diagrammatic […]. It operates by matter, not by substance, by 
function, not by form. But functions are not yet ‘semiotically’ 
formed, and matters not yet ‘physically’ formed. The abstract 
machine is pure Matter-Function – a diagram independent of the 
forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute. 
(ATP, 140-141) 
 
The abstract machine relates the content with expression and that makes and 
remakes the assemblage’s territory. The relation between abstract (machine) and 
concrete is necessary for all kinds of becoming(s), multiplicities. There is no abstract 
machine, or machines, in the sense of a Platonic Idea, transcendent, universal, 
eternal. Abstract machines operate within concrete assemblages: “They are defined 
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by [...] the cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialization. They draw these 
cutting edges” (ATP, 510).  
 
In that respect, Deleuze and Guattari conclude that the world is in fact a 
“mechanosphere... the set of all abstract machines and machinic assemblages outside 
the strata, on the strata, or between strata” (AO, 71).23 But stratification is never 
total. Matter-flows in continual processes of organization and disorganization on a 
single plane of reality: this is the (machine based) ontological vision of Deleuzian & 
Guattarian philosophy. 
 
4.2.2 Desiring Machine  
Desire is on the place of human beings in machinic ontology, and it is such a point 
that makes us active and responsible on the machinic connections. It is power in 
production.  Unlike Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology does not 
expound desire as a continuous lack, but as driving power of continuous 
production.24 Lack appears only at the level of interests or needs, desire, in 
Deleuzian and Guattarian sense, is a power that activates what we call as interest or 
need: “[d]esire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived 
from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces. Lack is a 
countereffect of desire (AO, 27)… In that respect, desire has an autonomous status. 
Also, there is no unified self or a personal self that forms a ground in which desire 
                                               
23
 The notion of strata is also the point that distinguishes two kinds of abstract machines: “the 
‘Ecumenon’ and the ‘Planomenon’. The Ecumenon defines the unity of composition of a given 
stratum; it is an abstract machine ‘enveloped within’ a stratum. The Planomenon, on the other hand, 
works across strata, carrying out processes of destratification on the plane of consistency” (AO, 73).  
24
 In that respect, it is curial to remind that “[t]here is no desire of power, it is a power which is desire” 
(K, 36). 
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arises. The personal self as ground of desire is also an effect that arises from desire 
and its machinery. For Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious is a factory rather than 
a theater. The unconscious constructs machines, which are desire machines. Desire 
does not speak, but engineers. It is not expressive or representative, but productive. 
It has its own repression and nothing else. “[A] direct link is perceived between 
machine and desire, the machine passes into the heart of desire, the machine is 
desiring and desire, machined” (AO, 285). 
 
Desire can not be postulated with/in subjectivity.  “If desire produces, its product is 
real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can 
produce only reality” (AO, 26). This is the paradox of desire. Reality is both the 
product of desire and the condition in which desire produces. The paradox 
disappears only in the sense that there is no separation of reality and desire.  Desire 
flows towards its product. Desiring machine is the productive assemblages of desire 
or intersecting paths of desire with its object.  “Desire and its object are one and the 
same thing: the machine... Desire is a machine and the object of desire is another 
machine connected to it (AO, 26).  
 
4.2.3 Body without Organs 
Body without Organs (BwO) is not an organless body, but body without 
organization. BwO is limit. “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't 
reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (ATP, 150). It limits the 
connections. The plane of consistency would be the totality of all BwO's, a pure 
multiplicity of immanence (ATP, 157). Every BwO is made up of plateaus. Every 
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BwO is itself a pla-teau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of 
consistency, and every BwO is a component of passage. 
 
In the BwO, there is no persistent organ. It is “anorganism of the body” and, in that 
respect, a critique of the notion of organism as the unity of specified units and parts.  
Its definition is various for each moment and person in the sense that it is “what 
remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the 
phantasy, and signifiances and subjectifications as a whole” (ATP, 151). “The 
Earth”, Deleuze and Guattari write as an example, “is a body without organs. This 
body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all 
directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles” 
(ATP, 40). A plateau is a piece of immanence.  
 
 
“The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a spatium 
that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is matter 
that occupies space to a given degree--to the degree corresponding to the intensities 
produced” (ATP, 153). In that respect, Deleuze and Guattari introduce BwO in three 
different senses. The first one is empty BwO. It is also named as ‘catatonic’ because 
it is entirely de-organ-ized. Although the flows pass through it, it functions no 
changes on them. In other words, it does not direct their pass, and it does not produce 
anything although any form of desire can be produced on it. The second one is the 
full or healthy BwO. It produces, but not petrified in its organ-ization. The third one 
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is cancerous BwO, which is caught in a pattern of endless reproduction of the self-
same pattern.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter is a research on the possibility of ontology of “and” in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy. The notion of “and” is the critique of aloneness. It says you 
are never alone. You have no beginnings and no ends. You were never a sheet of 
white blank paper. All of them are out of existence as relative stabilities. Then, the 
notion of “and” needs a different way of looking. This different way of looking is 
named with rhizome in their philosophy. It is the ground of a new way of doing 
ontology. It is to be on the way of deterritorilisation. And, in this chapter, I argue that 
machine can be named as ontology of rhizome or ontology of “and”.  
 
The notion of machine is the rejection of saying that it is my business and none of 
yours. Everyone is responsible from everything in different degrees. This means 
“everything is machine” and each machine always is connected with other machines. 
They have parts, but not unity. Moreover, parts are also machines.  Then, we have 
two sides for machines; internal parts and external parts, but they do not have 
externality. External parts are still parts of machine. Machines are always “in 
between”. Machines function or act without necessity of human being as a part of it. 
This means there is no ontological hierarchy between parts of machines.  
 
There is no unique or fixed function of each machine in the sense that the function of 
a machine is its production. Within different relations with different machines, the 
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production changes. Therefore, we must turn to meaning and working of production 
that is ontology as “and” which replaces ontology of “and”. In other words, 
machinic ontology functions in all philosophical aspects. It is node and does not 
accept raveling. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ONTOLOGY AS “AND”: ART MACHINE  
AND (MAIN) POLITICAL MACINES 
 
Machinic ontology, as I explained in Chapter 4, functions in ‘series’ (or ‘plateaus’) 
that ‘converge and become compossible’ at the same time as they ‘diverge and begin 
to resonate.’ This means Deleuze and Guattari’s postulation of machines operates on 
many levels at once. Although separate-levels (one-by-one level) seem useful to 
understand Deleuze’s machinic ontology, it results with not getting relational 
functions of levels. This means each level operates as a ‘heap’, which congregates 
different components, but is still (artificially) closed. Also, part of a machine may 
also be part of other machines. In that respect, although the concept of machine 
offers a philosophy of ontology, it is also a critique of ontology if ontology is a heap. 
Then; the integration of the ontology of machine with other philosophical 
postulations and questions is a necessity in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.  This 
is the necessity of wholeness, which passes through heaps and prevents being closed.  
This means ‘whole’ does not function as ‘unity’ in their philosophy, but rather as 
‘multiplicity’ that allows to all sorts of nomadic couplings and connections that are 
irreducible to an overarching (ontological) structure. Machinic ontology can not be 
reduced to itself in the sense that “[m]achines don't mean anything: they merely 
work, produce, break down. What we're after is only how something works in the 
real” (DES, 121). Machines “work, produce and break down” in all formations. 
Ontology of “and” is the description of how they produce, but this question has no 
end in itself, it is the base for what they produce as an expression of new realities and 
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for what reasons? This means ontology of “and” overflows and offers not only 
ontology. In other words, the production has ontological basis, but does not have 
only ontological meaning. Ontology of “and” offers a way of existence and if we 
accept its offering of connection, it has a significance in other formations. In other 
words, a desert is not only desert for the people living in it because the world is not 
only a living world: it is a world to be lived. Therefore, mechanic understanding must 
be integrated in all formations.  
 
 
Among all formations that machine covers, aesthetics and politics have a special 
place in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. Moreover, philosophy of ontology is 
mainly involved in their theories on aesthetics and politics, and ontology knots 
aesthetics and politics. In that respect, I do not describe their political and aesthetical 
theories, but the place of machinic ontology in such theories. How does machinic 
ontology grasp politics and aesthetics?  How does the politics work in machinic 
sense? What is the meaning of art works in machinic sense? How does the aesthetics 
work in machinic sense? The answers to these questions show that how political 
machine and art machine work in the sense of taking machines as social bodies. In 
that respect, I argue that in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, it is necessary to take 
ontology as “and” in aesthetics and politics.  
 
 
5.1 Art Machine                         
Art machine does not represent the world, but introduces new modes.25 It ensures 
that machinic assemblage and production offer new modes of living in the sense that 
                                               
25
 “No art and no sensation”, Deleuze and Guattari writes, “have ever been representational” (WP, 
193).  
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the production is equal to creation in art machine. With respect to the notion of 
creation, the production in art machine is always new. Then, art fulfils Deleuze and 
Guattari’s fundamental ontological condition, which is to create. However, this does 
not mean that art machine takes a place out of experience. The experience of art 
machine is what I call as creation.   
For Deleuze and Guattari aesthetics is not the determination of the 
objective conditions of any possible experience, nor does it determine 
the subjective conditions of any actual experience qua beautiful. 
Aesthetics instead involves the determination of real conditions that 
are no wider than the experience itself, that are once more, 
indiscernible from this experience. Aesthetics then, is inseparable 
from ontology because experience is, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
irreducibly real. (Zepke, 3)  
 
“Art is not chaos”, Deleuze and Guattari argue, “but a composition of chaos that 
yields the vision or sensation, so that it constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a 
composed chaos- neither foreseen nor foretold” (WP,204). Then, art machine is the 
relation between chaotic situations to become a composition of them. “Composition 
is the sole definition of art” (WP, 181), and “everything takes place between the 
compounds of sensations and the aesthetic plane of composition” (WP, 196). 
Sensations are percepts and affects, “beings” extracted from the perceptions and 
affections of everyday corporeal experience, which then become compositional 
elements that artist shapes on aesthetic plane of composition and renders perceptible 
through materials that have been rendered expressive (Bogue, 169).   
“Art must be critical enough to divert its contents and expressions 
back to the plane of consistency, to achieve an absolute 
deterritorialization.  But then, something must happen, something 
must emerge, the creative life of this plane must be expressed in 
sensation. And sensations must be created, as any artist knows, for the 
machine to work” (Zepke, 8).  
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In that respect, the sensations that belong to our daily experience are different than 
experience of art works in Deleuzian and Guattarian sense. Art creates its own 
sensations. Art deterritorilizes sensations of our daily sensations in the sense that 
although everyday sensations show everything at the same level, art work shows the 
sensations that make everything different in a real sense. For example, when we look 
at books at a library, we see them at the same level. In other words, the content of 
books is out of our perception and we search to find right books at the library. The 
names and call numbers that belong to books are keys to reach the content, which 
appears only when we read books. Similarly, our daily sensations are keys to the 
sensations of art works. Art deterritorilizes daily sensations for creating content.  
 
 
In Deleuzian and Guattarian terminology, aesthetics is possible with aesthetic effects 
and these effects are in general produced by two very specific kinds of machine: 
subject machine and art machine. The aesthetic effect is not the result of either the 
subject or the result of art machine, but it is the conjunction of art machine with 
subject machine. There is flow between these two machines. The object of an art 
work multiplies with a beholder, a special beholder in the sense that it is not 
everyone who comes into possession of meaning and takes the effect. This does not 
mean that art effect belongs to a social class, but rather the experience of art effect 
has a relation with other experiences that sustenance it. A beholder must have enough 
ground to correlate with art effect. Although everyone is subject machine, every 
subject machine is not a beholder of art affect. Moreover, each art work can need 
different beholders. It is possible that a specific beholder of art take affect(s) from an 
art work can not take art affect from others. In machinic sense, art here is fewer 
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labels for an object than a name for a specific kind of coupling. The subject machine 
functions as a boundary surrounding the ever expanding paths of effects coming from 
the art work. This means, at least in part, that they work. Then, the question is 
whether there are other machines that introduce aesthetic effects. The answer is in the 
affirmative. For a subject machine, it can be a drug machine, a meditation machine, 
or simply the interaction with another subject machine. On the other hand, there can 
be some art works that do not produce aesthetic effect at all, or producing a weak 
aesthetic effect along with a strong signifying effect, such as works of conceptual and 
abstract art.26 Then, although we separate art from other disciplines with its created 
sensations, aesthetic affect does not only belong to art and it is possible that a 
signifying effect can be foreground rather than aesthetic effect for an art work.  
 
There are other signifying effects such as political or critical effects and they might 
be also constructed within assemblages of art machine with other machines. Another 
way of saying this, artistic strategy can be directed toward, as the fist case, the 
determination of the effect desired and can go on the way of constructing the 
necessary machine for it, such as dissenting machine, fascist machine and socialist 
machine. For example, the films of Hitler’s Germany are mainly propaganda model 
and must be thought in relation to fascism machine or that Eisenstein’s films have 
mainly coupling with socialist machine. All of these combinations can take place. 
(O’Sullivan, 23). 
 
                                               
26
 In this respect, we must be aware that conceptual art does not create concepts, but they create 
sensations: “[a]bstract art and conceptual art are two recent attempts to bring art and philosophy 
together, but they do not substitute the concept for sensation; rather they create sensations and not 
concepts (WP, 198). 
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We introduce art as something that produces an aesthetic effect although it is 
“contingent” and “strategic”. This is the point that in art we can introduce “broken” 
machines that produce side effects. In other words, as I explained above, machinic 
thinking describes art with effects that it creates. However, the effects can not be 
described within machinic thinking because they are multiple within the divergent 
relations between art machine and subject machine. And it is possible that aesthetic 
effect and other effects (i.e. signifying and political effects) are together in an art 
work.  In this respect, although machinic ontology of art works generally describes 
conditions in which art works appear, the uniqueness of each art works is conserved 
in machinic thinking. Then, art machine is a broken machine that aggregate different 
components but it does not produce only one effect. With respect to broken 
machines, we can escape from the definitional problem with art that obsesses most of 
modernist thought. This means modernist thought takes art as separated subject to 
define it. The problem for modernist thought is, in general, to give properties to art 
that are not included within other disciplines. However, machinic thinking proposes a 
complex relationship between art machine and subject machine. And this perspective 
underlines art works rather than art as a general term.  
 
5.1.1 Case Study: Performance Art 
The artwork, in the performance art, is always an ‘and’ as a critique of ‘is’. 
Performance art interrogates the clarity of subjectivity, disarranging the clear and 
distinct positions that artists, artwork and viewer occupy. In other words, the space 
that performance art opens is the critique of traditional understanding on the 
subject/object distinction, the fields of artist, art work, viewer and milieu and the 
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relation of art and society. Trying to articulate the changed relationship between 
artist, artwork and viewer that performance art inaugurated can at times be difficult, 
but Deleuzian and Guattarian machinic ontology is especially useful here in which it 
allows us to consider art in terms of a transformative experience as well as 
conceptualize the process of the subjectification performance art sustains. 
Performance art as a practice aims at producing an encounter or event, not in the 
simplistic sense of something that ‘happened’ at a particular moment in time, but in 
so far as it aspires to bring a variety of elements and forces into relation with one 
another (Parr, 210). Ultimately, performance art involves a multiplicity of durations, 
each of which is implied in the art work as a machinic whole. 
 
A good example of this would have to be Vito Acconci’s Following Piece (1969) 
that began with a proposition randomly to follow people in New York. The idea was 
that the performance would independently arrive at a logical endpoint, regardless of 
the artist’s intention and despite the ‘goal’ of the work being achieved. Instead, it was 
the person being followed who brought the work to its final conclusion; for example, 
when she entered her apartment or got into her car and drove off. In this instance, the 
work was provisionally structured by a proposition that is ‘to follow another person’, 
but the eventual form the work took was structured by the movements of person 
being followed. In fact, here art can be considered as a process sensitive to its own 
transformation; as the artist was led around the city at the whim of someone else. 
There is a proposition to do ‘X’, then the activity of doing ‘X’ activates previously 
unforeseen organizations to take place; the art is in the ‘machinic production’. Art of 
this kind may be best articulated as ‘art without guarantees’: this is because it 
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operates to open up other possible worlds and exists entirely in duration and amidst 
the play of divergent forces that typifies Deleuze and Guattari’s postulation of 
‘machine’ (Parr, 210).  
 
5.2 Political (and Social) Machines 
In the collaborative works Deleuze and Guattari wrote together, we can find a 
variety of starting places, a variety of concepts that are agile enough to insert at 
different political levels. One of the concepts they rely on most is that of machine 
(May, 2005, 121). In political side, machinic thinking is, first of all, the acquaintance 
of more fluid, changeable political thought than we have been led to believe. It is to 
seek not for the eternal nature of traditional political entities: the nation, the state the 
people, the commodity. It is instead to seek what escapes them. However, this does 
not mean that one seeks for what lies outside of them. It means that one seeks for 
what escapes from them and within them. We no longer look for a transcendent or 
an outside. There is only immanence. “What Deleuze calls a line of flight is not a 
leap into another realm; it is a production within the realm of that from which it 
takes flight” (May, 2005, 128). Escape is constitutive.  
 
 
Machinic ontology means to pass from macropolitics to micropolitics, from molar to 
molecular. General political thought has been generally conceived in terms of the 
state or the economy, and Deleuze and Guattari, of course, discuss these terms at 
length. But only later, only after having establishing the primacy of the machinic 
which is to say the micropolitics. When we look from the primacy of machines, 
these macro political terms turn out to be inadequate. The distinction between 
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macropolitics and micropolitics is one of the most misunderstood points in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy. And if we take the concept of machine as grasping the 
distinction, we realize the role that they are meant to play.  The misunderstanding of 
the distinction postulates micropolitics and macropolitics as follows: The 
macropolitics deals with large “political entities” or “institutions”, such as Marxist 
concern with the economy, Liberal concern with the state, etc.   The micropolitics, 
however, turns to “the smaller scale” from “the grand scale” (May, 2005, 127). I 
think this does not have much to do with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
micropolitics. Like Bergsonian distinction between difference in quality (or in 
nature) and difference in quantity, micropolitics “is defined by the nature of its 
‘mass’- the quantum flow as opposed to molar segmented line” (ATP, 217). It does 
not include necessarily small elements or the smallness is not a case to understand 
micropolitics. A quantum flow is a virtual field that actualizes itself. It is a machinic 
process. Genetic information is a quantum flow. An egg is quantum flow. Matter is a 
quantum flow, a fact we understand when we subject it to conditions that are far 
from equilibrium (May, 2005, 127). Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari writes, 
“[e]verything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics” (ATP, 213). This means there are not two realms, micropolitics (or 
molecular) and macropolitics (or molar), that they overleap each other to form a 
political creation. Then, both micropolitics and macropolitics take role in political 
formation. Nevertheless, the micropolitics is principal in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
postulation. In this respect, the notion of social classes can be taken as a case study.  
Social classes themselves imply “masses” that do not have the same 
kind of movement, distribution, or objectives and do not wage the 
same kind of struggle. Attempts to distinguish mass from class 
effectively tend toward this limit: the notion of mass is molecular 
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notion operating according to a type of segmentation irreducible to the 
molar segmentarity of class. Yet classes are indeed fashioned from 
masses; they crystallize them. And masses are constantly flowing or 
leaking from classes. (ATP, 213) 
 
Are there classes? Are there states? Are there sexes and modes of production and 
ethnic groups and national territories? Yes, there are. In other words, Deleuze and 
Guattari do not ignore the existence of social classes, states etc. but they are “relative 
stables”. In other words, they are “products of machinic process that at once 
constructs them through the formation of connections and overspill them from 
within” (May, 2005, 128-129). The problem is to take social classes as constant and 
without the process of (machinic) relations. Such a process is what they call 
micropolitics.  
 
 Also, micropolitics responds to the concept of difference in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy in the sense that micropolitics offers us that the state and the economy 
are actualization, and there can be other actualizations as May says: 
Traditional political thought has ossified. It can only reflect upon the 
identities it sees as eternal: the state, the nation, the economy, the 
military, and behind them all, individual. But suppose these identities 
come later. Suppose they are not primacy items of politics. Suppose 
the world is indeed a world of difference. Then the individual, the 
state, the economy would be particular actualizations of a difference 
that need not be actualized in these ways, or that may be actualized in 
these ways but in many different ones as well. (May, 2005, 129) 
 
Beneath this critique lies another one. It may be possible to conceive our political 
world in terms of these identities. Even though they are not primary, even though 
they are built upon a realm of supple differences, there may be nothing incoherent 
about using these identities to understand and modulate our relations with one 
another. Traditional liberal thought uses these identities and it is not an impossible 
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way of thinking about politics. It is not entirely wrongheaded or self-contradictory. 
However, macropolitics captures inadequately some aspects of our political 
experience. It makes us passive subjects and does not relate our daily attitudes to 
political context.  Machines produce all kinds of connections that make us political 
machines and that will only begin to be seen if we turn away from traditional 
political thought (May, 2005, 130).  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, “[i]t’s easy to set up a correspondence between 
any society and some kind of machine, which isn’t to say that their machines 
determine different kinds of society but that they express the social forms capable of 
producing them and making use of them” (N, 180). In other words, machines are 
produced within societies. They are results of social formations. Likewise machines, 
social formations are within a process and the differences within a process result 
with different social machines. “[S]ocial formations” can be defined “by machinic 
process and not by modes of production (these on the contrary depend on the 
processes)” (ATP, 435). 27 
 
Deleuze and Guattari offer three main different social machines with respect to 
history. Although they introduce the changes between social machines, unlike Marx, 
they do not introduce evolution or development from one social machine to another. 
Such social machines are “the primitive territorial machine”, “barbarian despotic 
                                               
27
 “In contrast to Marx, economic modes of production do not define machinic connections. Rather, it 
is the other way around: economic modes of production are defined by the character of their machinic 
connections” (May, 2005, 126). However, although Deleuze and Guattari’s postulation of machine 
works  on a wider plane than Marx’s postulation of economic production, as Deleuze and Guattari 
says, the parallelism between Marx and they is to emphasize modes of production whether it is 
machinic or not. In other words, the problem that relates Deleuze and Guattari’s political theories and 
Marx’s is the value of production that   surrounding politics. Production is the form of what is going 
on.  
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machine” and “civilized capitalist machine”. These machines cover most of their 
theory of politics and my aim is not to introduce their theories on it, but rather to 
show, roughly, how (abstract) machinic ontology functions in different  social 
machines.  
 
The first form of social machines is the primitive territorial machine. It means 
recoding of the earth: “the earth is primitive, savage unity of desire and production” 
(AO, 140). When we think historically, the primitive territorial machine covers most 
of the history of human beings.  It organizes people with the kinship systems in the 
sense that proliferation is primary in primitive societies. Kinship systems divide 
people into groups or classes and give them roles in society. In such a system, two 
factors by which fluxes are coded in primitive society are filiation and alliance.  
“[F]iliation is the relationship of child to parent and alliance is the relationship 
among these lines, achieved primarily by marriage.”28 Filiation is administrative and 
hierarchical. Alliance is political and economic. Productions are recorded in 
filiation, but economy goes by alliance. And this is an “open cycle” of interaction of 
production and socius. They are immanent or horizontal and proliferating in all 
directions of the primitive territorial machine. Then, kinship system is a practice, not 
a structure “by means of the relationships which they establish between groups and 
the forms of exchange between them, kinship systems determine the flows of 
material production within primitive societies” (Patton, 90). 
 
                                               
28
  Michael Hardt. “Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari Capitalism & Schizophrenia” in 
http://www.duke.edu/~hardt/ao3.htm 
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The second form of social machines is barbarian despotic machine. It can be thought 
as addition of hierarchies to the classes of the primitive territorial machine. In other 
words, the process of classes encounters with the process of hierarchy and the 
second kind of social machine appears. The earth is replaced with the body of despot 
and he is the cause of all production and the final destination of all consumption. 
This despotic order is thus defined by new alliances (alliance reorganized by the 
despot) and by direct filiation (filiation to the despot). “It is like an immense right of 
the first-born over all filiations, an immense right of the wedding night over all 
alliances” (AO, 196). The State enters directly into all relations. Therefore, if the 
filiation and alliances of the primitive territorial machine are designated as "coding" 
the flux of desire, then here the State machine is "overcoding" the flux. Both the 
primitive and State machines hate and fear more than anything else decoded 
fluxes.29 All fluxes must be coded or overcoded. In other words, instead of recoding, 
barbarian despotic machine makes overcoding, which is the operation that 
constitutes the essence of the State.  
 
Civilized capitalist machine can be distinguished from previous social machines in 
the sense that capitalism as a machine has a unique mode of control and 
coordination. The primitive territorial machine and the barbarian despotic machine 
use codes for flows in the sense of security of themselves, and they declare that 
things that present themselves in these machines and can not be coded are 
adversaries. However, capitalist machine does not exclude anything. Everything 
solid melts into air in capitalism. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean with “the 
                                               
29
 Ibid 
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conjunction of deterritorialized flows” in capitalist machine (AO, 224). Capitalism 
bases on the negative of other social formations in the sense that it decodes flows. It 
cannibalizes all negativity. Capitalist machine can not produce codes.30 This is a 
disaster scenario for earlier social machines. They border and conserve themselves 
with coding, whether it is recoding or overcoding. In this respect, it passes from 
overcoding to decoding of flows and then it creates associations between decoded 
and deterritorialized flows, such as the association of worker and money. The 
deterritorialized worker becomes free and naked, and also he has to sell his labour 
capacity. Decoded money becomes capital and capable of buying this labour 
capacity (AO, 225). Capital can be seen as BwO of capitalist being. “This is exactly 
what Marx described as the process of primitive accumulation, which is the 
historical production of the conditions necessary for capitalist production, the most 
important of which is the creation of the proletariat, a free labor force.”31 However, 
capitalism isn't just an absolute deterritorialization. After, or in addition to, every 
deterritorialization it has to operate a reterritorialization. The question is how we can 
understand this reterritorialization as remaining on the plane of immanence and not 
as a return to the transcendence of previous territorializations.32 Deleuze and 
Guattari’s response is that the reterritorializations of capitalism take the form of an 
axiomatic, rather than a process of coding or overcoding. “The true axiomatic is that 
                                               
30
 This is a convoluted point in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in the sense that they define 
‘fascism’ and ‘archaism’ as codes that is continuing in capitalism. In other words, although they 
declare that capitalist machine does not produces codes and it decodes the codes produced by earlier 
machines, they accept that there can be some traces of earlier codes that function in capitalism. “We 
were still acting as though the matter were settled once and for all, at the dawn of a capitalism that had 
lost all code value. This is not the case, however. On the one hand, codes continue to exist--even as an 
archaism--but they assume a function that is perfectly contemporary and adapted to the situation 
within personified capital (the capitalist, the worker, the merchant, the banker)” (AO, 232). 
31
 Michael Hardt. “Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari Capitalism & Schizophrenia” in 
http://www.duke.edu/~hardt/ao3.htm 
32
 Ibid.  
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of the social machine itself, which takes the place of the old codings and organizes 
all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the 
benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of its ends” (AO,233). 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
“As statements are inseparable from systems, so visibilities are inseparable from 
machines. A machine does not have to be optical; but it is an assembly of organs and 
functions that makes something visible and conspicuous” (Deleuze, Foucault, 58). In 
that respect, Deleuze argues that although machines are not always ‘visible and 
conspicuous’, they are virtual assembly of things that are ‘visible and conspicuous’. 
Then, this chapter is a necessary conclusion of machinic understanding in the sense 
that ontology of machines is also the criticism of itself: ontology is ontology of 
things in machinic understanding. In other words, machines are never more than 
activities of themselves. This chapter indicates the assembly in art and politics with 
respect to ‘what art machine is’ and ‘what political machines are.’  
 
Deleuze and Guattari describe art as creation of sensations rather than the 
representation of a given situation. When the artist succeeds, he or she not only 
creates sensations within the artwork, but also gives them to us and makes us 
become with them; takes us up into the compound. It occurs with two machines that 
are subject machine and art machine. Subject machine is the beholder of the effects 
that come from art machine. It borders the affects. In other words, it is possible that 
art machine produces more affects than being held by beholder. Also, it is possible 
that art machine produces other affects (such as signifying affect) than aesthetic 
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affect and it is possible that other machines (such as drug machine) can produce 
aesthetic affect. This means the variables of producing affects in art machine and the 
variables that relate art machine with subject machine are contingent and subjective. 
There are subjective principles that are determined by interactions in art practices 
and they are mostly outside our control. Then, with respect to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy, we can say that art machine is a broken machine.  
 
All machines are social. They produce (and are produced) within social formations. 
Moreover, machinic thinking offers a different understanding of social formations. 
This corresponds to the privilege of micropolitics instead of macropolitics in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Micropolitics evaluates the things that can not be 
counted by macropolitics. This means macropolitics bases on general and perpetual 
principles of politics, whereas micropolitics bases on the process in which such 
principles are produced relatively.  
 
With respect to history, there are three main social machines. They are “the 
primitive territorial machine”, “barbarian despotic machine” and “civilized capitalist 
machine”. The primitive territorial machine codes the earth with kinship system. 
Barbarian despotic machine overcodes flows with relating them to benefits of 
despot.  Civilized capitalist machine bases on the negative of other social machines. 
It decodes all codes and deterritorilizes flows and then it creates axioms that relate 
deterritorialized flows to each other.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
If one takes ontology in an extremely rigorous sense, I think Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy has realized itself as ontology. This means with respect to their 
philosophy, saying yes to the question “Do they offer a theory of ontology?” requires 
freeing ontology from any kind of essentialism. This is the point that some 
interpreters of their philosophy reject any ontological formula because they do not 
replace “what things are” with “how things are” in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy. That said, to get an understanding of their theories of ontology, one must 
forget traditional problems of ontology although their theories of ontology are an 
open source and can be used for the answer of such problems. Deleuze uses the 
traditional or general ontological concepts, but really in a different way. This way 
opens a path to discuss existence in terms of relations or connections.  
 
To think existence as a collection of connections is a horror movie for our daily life. 
It almost disappears, for example, when someone says “hello”, and we recognize that 
“hello” is addressed to us (“not someone else”). Although this example bases on a 
relation, our daily life mostly bases on being a subject. This means ontology of “and” 
does not describe our daily life, but can offer a really different way of seeing and 
understanding of our daily life. In other words, there are abstract machines (such as 
subject machines, social machines and etc.) that order our daily life experiences and 
some of them can block other machines.   This paradox is at the centre of machinic 
ontology (or ontology of “and”): every machine can work or produce, but every 
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machine may not work or produce. Moreover, this paradox occurs only if we have 
connections with right machines.  
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